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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: FOCUSING THE
INQUIRY
By CATHY S. KRENDL** and JAMES R. KRENDL*
I. THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE VEIL DOCTRINE
A fundamental tenet of Anglo-American law is the concept
that a corporation will ordinarily be treated as a legal entity
separate from its shareholders.' The shareholders can thus confi-
dently commit limited capital to the corporation with the assur-
ance that they will have no personal liability for the corporation's
debts.' This tenet is based on the theory that the corporation is
an artificial entity, separate from the shareholders. 3 Further, it is
* Partner, Cohen, Brame, Smith & Krendl, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard
University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School. The authors wish to acknowl-
edge their appreciation to Mr. Arnold Guttenberg, a third-year law student at the Univer-
sity of Denver, who diligently and skillfully performed much of the legal research for this
article.
See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 122 at 293 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited
as BALLANTINE]; W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 25 at 100 (rev. vol. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 252 at 501 (2d ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN]; F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, § 1
at 1 (1931) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]. The general rule cited by these authorities is
usually cast in these words of Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905):
If any general rule can be laid down in the present state of authority, it is
that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
For an English case illustrating the strong policy of recognizing corporateness, see Salo-
mon v. A. Salomon & Co., L.R. [1897] A.C. 22, 38, rev'g Broderip v. Salomon, L.R.
[1895] 2 Ch. 323, cited in BALLANTINE, supra note 1, at 298-99.
1 Subscribers and shareholders will normally be liable to the corporation or its credi-
tors for the full consideration for which their shares are issued. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 410 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-4-120 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 162 (1974); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.23 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 628 (McKinney 1963); TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 1956).
1 For a discussion of the theories of corporateness (separate artificial entity versus
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based on the economic policy that shareholders should be encour-
aged to commit limited amounts of capital to an endeavor which
might be too risky for direct individual involvement.' Corporate
limited liability is fundamental to the law of every jurisdiction in
the United States. 5
There is no suggestion in the case law which will be discussed
later in this article of any basic change in this strong legal policy.
There are, however, numerous cases in which the corporate struc-
ture is used so improperly that the continued viability of the
corporation is unfair. In such circumstances, the courts will exer-
cise their equitable powers6 to disregard the corporate entity, to
"pierce the corporate veil," and thereby hold the proper parties
liable for the corporation's actions.'
Obviously, there are other legal remedies8 which would
achieve many of the same ends attained by piercing the corporate
collections of persons), see FLETCHER, supra note 1, at §§ 24-25; HENN, supra note 1, at §
78.
, For a brief review of the history of limited liability in English common law and in
the United States, see Carolan, Disregarding the Corporate Fiction in Florida, 27 U. FLA.
L. REV. 175, 177 n.10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Carolan]. For the general rationale
behind the policy of limited liability, see Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas & Shanks]; Comment, Should Shareholders be Personally Liable for the Torts
of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1190-91 (1967). See also Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d
552 (Conn. 1967) (Cotter, Assoc. J., dissenting).
See note 1 supra. In 1929, Douglas & Shanks confidently proclaimed:
Yet in spite of this apparent recession no one would claim that the availabil-
ity of limited liability played an insignificant part in the expansion of indus-
try and in the growth of trade and commerce. It has had a potent influence.
Limited liability is now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained
in our economic and legal systems. The social and economic order is arranged
accordingly. Our philosophy accepts it. It is legitimate for a man or group of
men to stake only a part of their fortune on an enterprise. Legislatures, courts
and business usage have made it so.
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 193-94. See Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247
App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 72 (1936).
a See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 122 at 326; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 141 at 559;
HENN, supra note 1, § 146 at 250.
' See BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 136 at 292-93; HENN, supra note 1, § 147, 148 at
293; FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 41; PowEL, supra note 1, § 18 at 95; R. STEVENS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 17 at 86 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
STEVENS].
For a succinct description of the noncorporate theories of liability, see Note,
Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1122, 1123-
25 (1958).
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veil: Agency,' fraud,'0 estoppel," contract or quasi-contract theo-
I Distinguished scholars have wrestled with the difference between an agency theory
and a piercing-the-corporate-veil theory for more than half a century. Although the dis-
tinction they make seems clear, some courts seem to confuse the issue. Consequently, each
new article on the subject must reiterate the distinction. In 1925, Professor Ballantine
stated that most of the opinions which disregard the corporate veil can be explained by a
liberal application of ordinary agency rules. See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAul. L. REv. 12, 15 (1925). Justice Cardozo in 1926 seemed
to agree that agency per se might not always be present in situations where justice requires
piercing the veil. In Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), he
stated:
Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent.
Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and
justice. Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal. Law Re-
view, 12 18, 19, 20. The logical consistency of a juridical conception will
indeed be sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is essential to the end that
some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. This is so, for
illustration, though agency in any proper sense is lacking, where the at-
tempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a fraud upon
the law. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civil & Commerce
Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 38 S. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 1229; United States v. Reading
Co., 253 U.S. 26, 61, 63, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760. At such times unity is
ascribed to parts which, at least for many purposes, retain an independent
life, for the reason that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privi-
lege to do business in a corporate form. We find in the case at hand neither
agency on the one hand, nor, on the other, abuse to be corrected by the
implication of a merger. On the contrary, merger might beget more abuses
than it stifled.
In 1929, Judge Learned Hand made the most sensible distinction: that express agency
would not provide a remedy because the consensual element would be lacking and that
implied agency would be inappropriate because that would mean that the veil would be
pierced in every situation. In Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31
F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929), Judge Hand stated:
One corporation may, however, become an actor in a given transaction, or
in part of a business, or in a whole business, and, when it has, will be legally
responsible. To become so it must take immediate direction of the transac-
tion through its officers, by whom alone it can act at all. [Citations omit-
ted.] At times this is put as though the subsidiary then became an agent of
the parent. That may no doubt be true, but only in quite other situations;
that is, when both intend that relation to arise, for agency is consensual. This
seldom is true, and liability normally must depend upon the parent's direct
intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's paraphernalia of
incorporation, directors and officers. The test is therefore rather in the form
than in the substance of the control; in whether it is exercised immediately,
or by means of a board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative
and responsibility in respect of each transaction as it arises. Some such line
must obviously be drawn, if shareholdering alone does not fuse the corpora-
tions in every case.
Hand's distinction was adopted and elaborated by POwELL, supra note 1, at 94. This same
analysis is often made by modern commentators. See note 8 supra, at 1124. However, some
1978
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ries such as unjust enrichment, 2 and breach of fidiciary duty13 are
among such alternative bases for relief. Indeed, it is common in
corporate veil cases for a complaint to state a claim based on one
courts continue to be confused. They use agency as a synonym for instrumentality and
then also use agency in the correct sense. The difference between the two, or indeed the
meaning of agency in a particular opinion, is often not clear. See FLETCHER, supra note 1,
§ 43 at 209-10. For a general survey of the instances where the traditional rules of agency
would be appropriate, see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 30 at 130.
10 Misrepresentation is often not a helpful remedy in these situations, either because
the misrepresentation is in the nature of an opinion or conclusion, because there is no proof
of detrimental reliance, material misrepresentation, intent, or because of statutes of limi-
tations. See POWELL, supra note 1, at 63. Powell illustrates a kind of misrepresentation
often found in the corporate veil area with these examples: where the officers of the parent
corporation in their reports or correspondence or in their oral statements to the plaintiff
state that the parent is "back of" the subsidiary or that the subsidiary is the same as the
parent or a mere department or division of its business. See notes 111-19 infra and accom-
panying text.
For examples of the corporate entity being disregarded in the case of fraudulent
transfer in hindrance of corporate creditors, see generally FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 44 at
238-39; HENN, supra note 1, § 146. For an illuminating description of the relationship
between fraudulent transfers and piercing the corporate veil, see Clark, The Duties of the
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1977).
1 Traditional estoppel will often be useless because it requires proof of detrimental
reliance which is usually not present in the typical piercing-the-corporate-veil case. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 at 215 (1975). For a comparison of
traditional estoppel with the kind of estoppel-like conduct present in piercing-the-veil
cases, see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § .47 at 274; POWELL, supra note 1, § 13(e) at 66; Note
supra note 8, at 1125.
"2 But see United States v. Dean Van Lines, 531 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1976), where the
United States brought suit against a Belgian subsidiary's American corporate parent,
seeking an accounting and collection of overcharges allegedly made by the subsidiary. The
Belgian subsidiary had overcharged the United States when acting as its freight forwarder,
and the parent had sold the stock of its subsidiary. The Government alleged that the
parent had realized an inflated price for the shares as a result of the overcharges. The
parent had not liquidated the subsidiary, and, according to the court, there was no show-
ing that the United States could not pursue its claim against the subsidiary. The Govern-
ment admitted that it could not prove that the former subsidiary was the alter ego or
instrumentality of its parent and that, therefore, it was proceeding on an unjust enrich-
ment theory, not the corporate theory of piercing the veil. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court and held that on these facts-particularly in view of the failure of the Govern-
ment to show a unity of interest between these two corporations-the government could
not recover.
'1 For a recent discussion of the requirements of the fiduciary duty theory, see gener-
ally Comment, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary
Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964). For example, in Zohn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d
36 (3d Cir. 1947), the directors of the corporation were found liable for calling certain stock
of minority shareholders in order to increase the value of stock held by another corporation
which controlled such directors. On slightly different facts, it can be seen that the corpo-
rate shareholder might be liable on a piercing-the-veil cause of action for causing the
partially owned subsidiary to take actions in the interest of the parent.
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or more of these theories as well as the piercing-the-corporate-veil
theory.'4 The corporate veil theory, although similar to certain
other causes of action in some respects, is not congruent with any
of them.
One can imagine, for example, a hypothetical situation
which would represent a composite of a number of recent corpo-
rate veil cases.'5 Assume that a corporation sets up a subsidiary
to engage in some high risk activity related to the parent's busi-
ness. The corporate formalities between the companies are cas-
ually observed: They operate out of the same office with the same
officers and directors, they participate in the same projects with
confused lines of authority between them, and they transfer
money and other assets between them without proper accounting
or consideration. Third parties dealing with the parent and sub-
sidiary are not fully aware of the distinction between the two
companies, and, either through deliberately misleading state-
ments or through a failure to correct the impression given to such
third parties, the related corporations encourage or permit such
confusion. As a result of initial undercapitalization or because the
subsidiary is operated in an unprofitable manner, the parent ends
up with all of the fruits of their combined business activities and
the subsidiary is left insolvent.
Then, a creditor or tort victim of the subsidiary corporation
finds that the subsidiary is judgment proof while the parent
which has grown prosperous on the subsidiary's activities has no
contractual or other obligation to the plaintiff. Seeking redress
against the parent, the plaintiff may allege fraud (on the theory
that the parent represented itself as being liable for the subsidi-
" See, e.g., Bernardin, Inc. Midland Oil Corp. 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975) (fraudu-
lent transfer possible alternative theory); Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324
F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963) (agency pleaded); Puamier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019
(E.D. Va. 1974) (misrepresentation or estoppel possible theories); Whayne v. Transporta-
tion Management Serv., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (agency pleaded); Savage
v. Royal Properties, Inc., 4 Ariz. App. 116, 417 P.2d 925 (1966) (estoppel); Soderberg
Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974) (court
said judgment could be upheld on the theories of agency and estoppel).
'1 See, e.g., Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975);
Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); Puamier v. Barge
BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Va. 1974); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552
(1967); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974);




ary's debts), fraudulent transfers of property (on the theory that
money or assets were improperly transferred from the subsidiary
to the parent), agency (on the theory that the subsidiary acted
at the direction of the parent), breach of fiduciary duty (on the
basis that the directors and officers of the subsidiary wasted its
assets in order to benefit the parent), or any number of other
causes of action. In such a situation, the corporate veil doctrine
may provide a more realistic measure of the essence of the claim,
that is, that the parent, not the subsidiary, is the real party in
interest. More important, it may be easier for the plaintiff to
carry his burden of proof under the corporate veil theory than
under other legal theories.
A plea to pierce the corporate veil may occur in a wide vari-
ety of circumstances: against the sole individual shareholder of a
close corporation"6 or against a substantial parent corporation
with one or more subsidiaries;" it may arise against an affiliated
group of corporations with a common shareholder or sharehold-
ers; ' the party sought to be held liable may not even be a share-
holder, but rather a creditor or optionee. 11 The plaintiff may be a
party to a contract with the subsidiary who claims that he relied
on representations that the parent would back the subsidiary, 0
or he may be a tort victim who had no knowledge of the defendant
prior to the incident giving rise to his claim.2 Obviously some-
what different policy considerations are involved in such cases,
2 2
" See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988
(1968).
" See, e.g., Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
" See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carleton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966), 276
N.Y.S.2d 585.
,1 See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098 (5th Cir. 1973) (creditor); Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash.
App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974) (optionee).
2 See, e.g., Paumier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Va. 1974).
23 See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963). For
other examples of the vast variety of contexts in which this question arises, see
BALLANTNE, supra note 1, § 121 (tax), §§ 129, 139 (bankruptcy and receivership), 140
(jurisdiction and service of process); FLrcHER, supra note 1, §§ 40, 43, 45.1 (tax); HENN,
supra note 1, §§ 149-153; STEvENs, supra note 7, § 17.
21 The creditor elects to extend credit to a corporate entity; the tort victim does not.
On that basis, most commentators suggest that the courts should view such claims from
different perspectives. See BALANrINE, supra note 1, § 137 at 315; HENN, supra note 1, §
146 at 252-54; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 210-11; Carolan, supra note 4, at 194;
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REv. 979, 984 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
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but a common set of rules and equitable principles are usually
applied to all of them.
23
The corporate veil concept therefore serves a useful if ambig-
uous role in the law. Because the remedy is essentially equitable 
2
and because disregarding the corporate entity requires contra-
dicting the strong public policy of limited liability, the courts
reluctantly, inconsistently, and sometimes unclearly determine
how and when to pierce the veil.25 This article will discuss the
historical development of the principal applicable rules, consider
in some detail what we will refer to as the "Powell" rule, analyze
a number of recent cases within the structure of what we believe
are the ultimate issues which courts consider in determining
when to pierce the veil, and, finally, suggest some considerations
and procedures which may help corporations weave more impene-
trable veils and assist plaintiffs in piercing the veil.
2
Hamilton]; Comment, supra note 4, at 1190. See also Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 521 S.W.2d
639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); But see notes 121-25 infra and accompanying text.
The policy considerations are different when the defendant is a corporation rather
than an individual. Should the veil of one corporation (a subsidiary, for example) be
pierced to reach the assets of another corporation (the parent), the personal assets of the
shareholders of the parent corporation are still protected by the parent's corporate shield.
In other words, such shareholders have a double layer of insulation not available in
situations where piercing the veil of a closely held corporation would immediately jeopard-
ize all of the personal assets of the shareholders. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
Generally, the principles governing one-man, family, and other close corporations
are applicable to subsidiary and other affiliated corporations. See BALUANriNE, supra note
1, § 136 at 311; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209; HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258-59;
STEvENS, supra note 7, at 85. It has, however, been suggested that courts are more willing
to pierce the veil when a corporation rather than an individual is the defendant. See
Hamilton, supra note 22, at 992.
24 See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.2 at 179; HENN, supra note 1, § 94 n.5, § 146 n.2,
§ 148 n.7, § 150 n.16.
25 In 1925, Ballantine, supra note 9, at 15, described this area of law as a "legal
quagmire." In 1926, Justice Cardozo stated in Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84,
155 N.E. 58 (1926), that this subject was enshrouded in "mists of metaphors," a phrase
which Douglas agreed was appropriate in 1929. See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at
218. Professor Ballantine in his treatise in 1946, supra note 1, § 136 at 312, stated that
there was still no guidance in the opinions to solve the variety of problems in this area:
"The deciding and differentiating factors in any particular situation are often difficult to
discover in the opinions. The formulae invoked usually give no guidance or basis for
understanding the results reached." Current commentators continue to emphasize the
confusion in this area of law, and the general failure of courts to articulate reasoned
grounds of decision. See Hamilton, supra note 22 and note 8. Courts also decry the
confusion; see, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973).
" This article will deal primarily with corporate cases subject to presumably uniform
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A. Approaches to Piercing the Corporate Veil
The corporate veil area of law seems peculiarly susceptible
to unhelpful rhetorical devices. Some of the terms which have
been used to discuss or describe a corporation whose veil should
be pierced include "mere adjunct, agent, alias, alter ego, alter,
idem, arm, blind, branch, buffer, cloak, coat, corporate double,
cover, creature, curious reminiscence, delusion, department, dry
shell, dummy, fiction, form, formality, fraud on the law, instru-
mentality, mouth piece, name, nominal identity, phrase, pup-
pet, screen, sham, simulacrum, snare, stooge, subterfuge, and
tool."2
1. Early Case Law
A fair starting point for analyzing this rhetoric is to examine
the early case law. Perhaps the earliest important case is United
rules. However, it should be recognized that numerous cases apply specialized rules. See
Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634
(8th Cir. 1975) (corporate veil of fund raising company is pierced to find in personam
jurisdiction over chief executive officer of company resulting from breach of contract);
Bruhn's Freezer Meats of Chicago, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 438 F.2d
1332 (8th Cir. 1971) (corporate veil pierced to find parent corporation liable for evasion of
Packers and Stockyards Act by subsidiary); Griffin & Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 802
(Ct. Cl. 1968) (veil of the subsidiary is pierced to hold the parent liable for federal income
taxes of subsidiary in a two year period in which the subsidiary did not carry on a
substantial business); Hillebrand v. Say-Co., 353 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. I1. 1972) (corporate
veil of parent pierced to allow trustee in bankruptcy to set aside certain voidable transfers
occurring within four months of bankruptcy by the subsidiary); ABC Great States, Inc.
v. Globe Ticket Co., 304 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (corporate veil of parent is pierced
to subject the subsidiary to venue in the jurisdictions where venue was proper on the
parent in antitrust proceeding); In re Farmers Federation Cooperative, Inc., 242 F. Supp.
400 (W.D.N.C. 1965), modified on other grounds, 368 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1966) (in a
bankruptcy proceeding subsidiary given same status as parent); Co-Con, Inc. v. Bureau
of Revenue, 87 N.M. 118, 529 P.2d 1239, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974)
(parent and subsidiary corporation are treated as one corporation for purpose of taxing
gross receipts, based on certain construction equipment without regard to which corpora-
tion had the legal title to the equipment); People ex rel. Bolton v. Progressive Gen. Ins.,
44 Ill. 2d 392, 256 N.E.2d 338 (1969) (in insurance company rehabilitation proceeding, sole
shareholder is ordered to "turn over" certain premium trust funds); State Bank of Cerro
Gordo v. Benton, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 317 N.E.2d 578 (1974) (corporation's veil is pierced
to prevent controlling shareholder from avoiding sales tax and transferring property to
himself to avoid paying a creditor's claim); Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 20, 514 P.2d 888 (1973) (corporate veil pierced to find corporation
liable for violation of liquor license law because of previous conduct of corporation's sole
shareholder). Most of these cases will be disregarded in the course of this article because
they involve special considerations which are not applicable to the area generally.
21 HENN, supra note 1, § 146 n.2.
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States v. Reading Co. 2 In that case the United States brought
suit under an antitrust statute which provided that it was unlaw-
ful for any railroad company to transport in interstate commerce
"any article or commodity that . . . [is] mined or produced by
it, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may
have any interest, direct or indirect." The Reading Railroad had
established an elaborate corporate structure whereby a coal com-
pany originally organized by Reading became the wholly owned
subsidiary of a holding company which also owned Reading. The
Court looked through this subterfuge to find a violation of the
statute.
The Reading case involved both a strong public policy, as
embodied in a statute, and a cause of action which might have
rested solely on a liberal construction of the statute in question.
However, the Court chose to adopt a broader line of attack by
piercing the corporate veil of the elaborate structure to treat the
coal company, the railroad company, and the holding company
as a single entity.
The most widely cited of the early cases is Berkey v. Third
Avenue Railroad Co." In that case Judge Cardozo refused to
pierce the corporate veil of a street car subsidiary corporation to
find its parent liable for a personal injury to the plaintiff. The
accident in question occurred on a street car belonging to the
- 253 U.S. 26 (1920). This case was cited by the early commentators. See POWELL,
supra note 1, at 7. It is occasionally cited by courts today. See, e.g., Int'l R.R. v. United
Brands, 532 F.2d 231, 248 (2d Cir. 1976); Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1319 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
240 F.2d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1959).
- 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926). In POWELL, supra note 1, at 93, it
is noted that Berkey was a widely discussed case in the late 20's and early 30's. This case
continues to be cited frequently. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3, n.52, and HENN, supra
note 1, § 94, n.5, § 146, nn.2 & 24, § 148, n.7, § 150, n.16. See also Lehigh Valley Indus.,
Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1975); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973); Estate of Stranahan v.
Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Murray v. Murray Laboratories, 223 Ark.
907, 912-13, 270 S.W.2d 927, 930 (1954); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. Dunn,
230 Ga. 345, 371, 197 S.E.2d 129, 143 (1973), (Hawes, J., dissenting); Carrol v. Caldwell,
12 I1. 2d 487, 497, 147 N.E.2d 69, 74 (1958); Goodwin v. S.A. Healy Co., 383 Mich. 300,
309, 174 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1970); Petition of White Mountain Power Co., 96 N.H. 144, 150,
71 A.2d 496, 502 (1950); Ford v. McCue, 163 Ohio St. 498, 502, 127 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1955);
United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 509, 209 A.2d 215, 220 (1965); Bell Oil & Gas
Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. 1968).
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42nd Street, Manhattenville and St. Nicolaus Railroad Company
which was a subsidiary of the Third Avenue Railroad. Facts
which indicated that the 42nd Street Company was not a genuine
separate corporation were that the subsidiary's cars were marked
with the parent's name, the annual report of the parent referred
to the subsidiary as part of the system, the employees of the
companies regarded them as identical, many functions such as
printing and purchasing were handled on centralized basis, the
parent directly paid for certain expenses of the subsidiary, and
the parent had made substantial loans to the subsidiary. 0 On the
other hand, Cardozo emphasized that the subsidiary maintained
its own bank account, paid the wages of its lower level employees
out of such account, had not been organized by the parent, had
substantial assets, negotiated loans from the parent in an arm's
length manner, and separated its operations to some degree from
affiliated lines, for example, by not allowing its motormen and
conductors to travel beyond its lines.
3'
Although Berkey was a civil action for injuries, piercing the
veil of the subsidiary-or treating the parent and subsidiary as
one entity-might have suggested that the corporations had vio-
lated a criminal statute which made it illegal for a franchise to
be assigned (in this case from the subsidiary to the parent) with-
out the approval of the proper regulatory commission. In refusing
to pierce the veil, Cardozo placed considerable emphasis on the
seriousness of inferring a violation of the criminal statute.
32
The most interesting and significant part of this case was not
its holding, but this famous, oft-quoted language in which Car-
dozo struggles to impose some kind of rational order on the meta-
phors to which the courts had resorted in attempts to propound
rules for disregarding the corporate entity:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidi-
ary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mist of meta-
phor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
the devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. We
say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the
3o 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926).
31 Id.
3, Id. at 91, 155 N.E. at 60. But see Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 198-99, who
argue that the subsidiary would not be an instrumentality in the absence of the criminal
statute.
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parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary which
is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough
if the picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that
the essential term is to be defined in the act of operation. Dominion
may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general
rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an
agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the test of
honesty and justice. Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corpora-
tions, 14 Cal. Law. Rev. 12, 18, 19, 20. The logical consistency of a
juridical conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the
sacrifice is essential to the end that some accepted public policy may
be defended or upheld. This is so, for illustration, though agency in
any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted separation be-
tween parent and subsidiary will work a fraud upon the law. (Cita-
tion omitted) At such times, unity is ascribed to parts which, at
least for many purposes, retain an independent life, for the reason
that only thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do
business in a corporate form. We find in the case at hand neither
agency on the one hand, nor, on the other, abuse to be corrected by
the implication of a merger. On the contrary, merger might beget
more abuses than it stifled.n
2. The Powell Synthesis
In 1931 Frederick J. Powell published a monumental study,
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations,3 4 which attempted to syn-
thesize those cases which had disregarded the corporate entity.
Powell described an "instrumentality" test which he perceived to
be the test for determining whether a subsidiary is in fact so
dominated by its parent that its veil should be pierced to find the
parent liable. Although Powell's test was derived from a study of
the parent-subsidiary relationship and may have been meant to
apply exclusively to that relationship, it has been applied with
equal force to pierce the veil of closely held corporations to hold
the individual shareholders liable.
3 5
a. Lowendahl: An early application of the Powell
synthesis
One of the early cases which used the Powell synthesis, al-
though in a slightly modified form, was Lowendahl v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. 36 In Lowendahl two insolvent individuals had, prior
244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
" See note 1 supra.
See note 7 supra.
247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
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to the entry of the judgment against them in favor of Lowendahl,
transferred substantially all of their assets to a newly-created
corporation in exchange for forty-nine percent of its stock. The
defendant B&O Railroad was the majority shareholder of such
corporation and, when Lowendahl failed to recover against either
of the individual debtors or against the insolvent transferee cor-
poration, he sued B&O on the theory that the corporate veil of
the transferee corporation should be pierced to hold B&O liable.
In refusing to pierce the corporate veil, the court emphasized
that the individual judgment debtors had formed their scheme to
evade creditors long before they approached the defendant and,
therefore, that the B&O Railroad had played no direct role in the
injury to the plaintiff.3 The court also found that the B&O Rail-
road did not in fact control the subject corporation at the time of
the fradulent transfer, that it paid fair value for its stock and
received no assets from the defunct corporation, and that it was
not shown even to have had any knowledge or warning of the
improper activities of the insolvent individual shareholders.38 Cit-
ing Powell generally, the Lowendahl court stated that three ele-
ments must be proved to pierce the corporate veil:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but com-
plete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other
positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. 9
b. The impact of the Powell synthesis
It is interesting that the Lowendahl court chose a rule
strongly supportive of corporative limited liability when Lowen-
dahl had such a weak case for relief on the facts. One explanation
might be that the court felt the need to preserve the rules of
limited liability in the depression era. Otherwise, widespread cor-
" 247 App. Div. at 158, 287 N.Y.S. at 77.
Id. at 160-61, 287 N.Y.S. at 79-80.
Id. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76.
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porate failures might have encouraged a multiplicity of lawsuits
where hopeful plaintiffs would seek to pierce corporate veils to
find shareholders personally liable.
Derived from Powell's examination of the earlier case, the
Lowendahl case is one of the most frequently cited cases in this
area,40 and is frequently followed either expressly or implicitly by
other courts. Although the Powell rule is itself solidly grounded
on case law, it represents a composite of factors considered by the
courts. In other words, some courts rely only on one or two of the
Powell factors and do not require all three. Therefore, the Powell
rule is of interest, not only because it is perhaps the most fre-
quently applied and most clearly articulated of the rules in the
corporate veil area, but also because its parts include most of the
other rules in this area.4"
The Powell rule was derived to a large extent from a study
0 See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972);
Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 422 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1970);
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1963); Fisser
v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1960); Atlantic Mgmt. Corp. v. American
Cas. Co., 141 F.2d 108, 110 (3rd Cir. 1944); Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc. 426 F. Supp. 44, 48
(S.D. Miss. 1976); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F.
Supp. 1069, 1091 (D. Neb. 1976); Garrow v. Soo Line R.R., 361 F. Supp. 764, 768 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
412, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Nato v. Cia Secula di Armanento, 310 F. Supp. 639, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Broene v. Beaunit Corp., 305 F. Supp. 688, 694 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Brown
v. Margrande Compania Naviera, S.A., 281 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (E.D. Va. 1968); National
Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Jackson
v. General Elec. Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alas. 1973); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 577,
227 A.2d 552, 558 (1967); Grand Lodge of Iowa of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows
v. Grand Lodge No. 18, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 178 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Iowa
1970); Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970);
Mills v. Murry, 472 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Mo. 1971); Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88,
91, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (1971); Musman v. Modern Deb, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 761, 762, 377
N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (1975); Pilot Title Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 11 N.C. App. 444, 450,
181 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1971); Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash.
App. 721, 732, 524 P.2d 1355, 1363 (1974).
11 In HENN, supra note 1, § 147 at 256-59, it is stated that corporateness may be
disregarded if (1) the corporation is used for an illegitimate purpose or, absent such a
purpose, (2) the corporation is conducted on a personal not a corporate basis (specifically,
in the case of parent-subsidiaries, intermingling of business, lack of formalities, represent-
ing to the public that the enterprises are the same), or (3) the enterprise is inadequately
capitalized. Similarly, in FLetCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209, it is stated that the corporate
veil will be pierced either upon a showing of instrumentality or fraud. Accord, BALLANTINE,
supra note 1, at 302-05. But see Note, supra note 8, at 1125, where the author concluded
that most courts require a showing of both "instrumentality" and "injustice." He observes
that "instrumentality" seems to imply some form of injustice.
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of early New York cases, and the influence of those cases contin-
ues today. As a commercial center, New York generated many of
the most important corporate veil cases. Early opinions by distin-
guished jurists, including Cardozo12 and Learned Hand,43 have
carried great persuasive weight, and Powell himself was a New
York attorney. Moreover, the difficulty of the issues raised by
corporate veil cases, the inability of most courts to develop a
comprehensive independent approach to the problem," and the
force of the New York opinions frequently have caused other juris-
dictions to follow New York case law. As a result, the tendency
of New York courts to take a somewhat restrictive view 5 toward
disregarding the corporate entity may be discerned in other juris-
dictions.
c. Other attempts to systemize the law
There have been any number of other attempts to systema-
tize the law in the corporate veil area." The California courts
have sometimes emphasized undercapitalization to the exclusion
of other factors in finding grounds for piercing the veil.47 Many
courts have analyzed the problem through an "alter ego" or
' See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
,3 Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
" See generally note 15 supra.
4" See POWELL, supra note 1, at 32-33. See also Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn
Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where in a breach of contract action the
court refused to pierce the veil of a subsidiary because under New York law the creditor
cannot bring an action against the parent until he exhausts his remedy against the subsid-
iary by the return of an execution wholly or partly unsatisfied. Such a requirement-which
necessitates time and expense in attorney's fees-serves little purpose since one of the
issues in a case of this nature is whether the subsidiary is adequately capitalized. That
issue can be-as it is in other jurisdictions-determined without demanding the return of
execution.
" In 1925, in BALLANTINE, supra note 9, at 20, it was said that the courts usually
pierced the corporate veil upon a showing of (1) agency or (2) the use of the corporation
as an instrumentality to sanction a fraud or promote injustice. Douglas & Shanks, in 1929,
supra note 4, at 218, said that the courts would pierce the veil under circumstances they
categorized as (1) inadequacy of capital; (2) direct intervention which ignores the normal
and orderly procedure of corporate control; or (3) avoiding an inequitable result. The
recent attempts to categorize the case law, see Note, supra note 8, at 1125-28 (inadequate
capitalization and intermeddling) and Hamilton, supra note 22, at 985 (inadequate capi-
talization and the commingling of shareholder and corporate affairs). All of these consider-
ations and categories are subsumed in the Powell approach.
,7 See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961);
W. CARY, CORPORATIONS at 127 (4th ed. 1969).
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"identity" test, although such an analysis seems to be essentially
the same as Powell's instrumentality rule. 8 Some states have
refused to pierce the veil absent a showing of fraud, the second
leg of the Powell rule, 9 while others, almost eliminating the ne-
cessity for a showing of any kind of wrongdoing, hold a defendant
liable where it is shown that the defendant dominated another
corporation and some loss was suffered by the plaintiffA0 A few
courts have utilized the "economic entity" concept, first pro-
pounded by Professor Berle."
Under the Berle view, related corporations may be viewed as
a single economic entity so that, in effect, the veil of each corpora-
tion is pierced to obtain the benefit of the total assets of all the
corporations.
B. Analysis of the Powell Rule
The Powell rule, followed in whole or in part by most courts,
consists of three legs: instrumentality, improper purpose, and
proximate causation. In a strict application of the Powell test,
each of these elements must be proven in order to pierce the veil.
11 For application of the alter ego approach, see, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v.
American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972); Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.
v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974);
Schlecht v. Equitable Builders, Inc., 272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975); Gentry v. Credit Plan
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 244 Ill. App. 3d
21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974). These cases use the "alter ego" jargon, but apply at least the
first two legs of the Powell test. Indeed, the Koscot court at 468 F.2d 64, 67 n.2, stated
that although commentators have attempted to distinguish among the various theories,
they are all interchangeable. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.1 at 171, where the alter
ego approach is described in the same terms as the Powell rule:
To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that shareholders' disre-
gard of the corporation made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction
of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist;
and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or
protect fraud.
, See Carolan, supra note 4, at 181. In BALuNr.ME, supra note 1, § 138 at 318, it is
said that the question turns not on instrumentality but rather on inadequacy of capital
or other abuse of control.
' See note 32 supra. See also Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d
667 (1971).
11 Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947). For a judicial
consideration of this theory see Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp.




We will therefore consider the three legs of the rule separately,
but it must be borne in mind that the demarcation between the
facts showing one element and the facts showing another is by no
means always clear.
1. Instrumentality
This is the leg of the Powell rule on which the greatest
amount of verbiage has been expended, and it is probably the
most difficult of the three legs to define. The concept is that a
plaintiff must prove that the subsidiary or other subservient cor-
poration was operated not in a legitimate fashion to serve the
valid goals and purposes of that corporation but that it func-
tioned under the domination and control and for the purposes of
some dominant party.52 Such domination must be something sub-
stantially more than the control which would be exercised by any
majority shareholder or every corporation would be automatically
subject to having its veil pierced.53 Further, the domination, ac-
cording to the letter of the Powell rule, must be domination with
respect to the particular transaction attacked as opposed to domi-
nation in general.
54
a. The Powell circumstances
Although no single fact or set of facts is determinative, Pow-
ell identified eleven circumstances which in a variety of combina-
tions may indicate that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality.
These are as follows:
1. The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of
the subsidiary.
2. The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors
or officers.
3. The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
5' United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074, 1083 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (distinction between managerial and ministerial assimilation); Siboney
Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (key is whether control over
routine business transactions exists). See BALLANrINE, supra note 1, § 136 at 313 (share-
holder must control and manipulate corporation); FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209 (the
corporation must have no separate mind, will, or existence of its own and be merely a
business conduit for its principal). See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4 (assimilation
for management purposes).
11 FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 33 at 144-46, § 41.2 at 180; § 43 at 210; HENN, supra note
1, § 147 at 256; STEVENS, supra note 7, § 17.
11 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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4. The parent corporation subscribes to all of the capital stock of
the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
5. The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
6. The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or
losses of the subsidiary.
7. The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the
parent corporation, or no assets except the ones conveyed to it by
the parent corporation.
8. In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of
the officers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division
of the parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility
is referred to as the parent corporation's own.
9. The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its
own.
10. The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act inde-
pendently in the interest of the subsidiary, but take their orders
from the parent corporation in the latter's interest.
11. The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not ob-
served.5
b. The significance of the Powell circumstances
Fact 10-that the officers and directors of the subsidiary do
not act independently-would appear to be the most significant
fact, but it is also more a conclusion than an evidentiary fact.
Many of the other facts simply tend to establish the existence or
nonexistence of number 10. We would prefer to think of the Pow-
ell circumstances as "indicia." In some cases, the presence of all
or most of such "indicia" tends to establish that the subsidiary
corporation is not really a separate and independent entity and
is therefore a mere instrumentality of the parent. In other cases,
the presence of most or even all of such "indicia," with the possi-
ble exception of number 10, may not necessarily prove that the
subsidiary is an instrumentality. Moreover, in still other cases, a
subsidiary is found to be an instrumentality of the parent where
many of these indicia are not present.5 6 The factors identified by
Powell are therefore by no means a fully satisfactory test for
determining whether one corporation is an instrumentality of
another. They do, however, provide a useful and specific begin-
ning to an analysis of the instrumentality metaphor.
POWELL, supra note 1, at 9.
56 See Caple v. Raynel Campers Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974).
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The instrumentality analysis is used by most courts in some
form or another because it provides a basis for determining that
the defendant is a real party in interest. If the defendant domi-
nates the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary has no
will of its own, the parent, in effect, has itself acted to commit
the wrong to the plaintiff. Since the parent was the wrongdoer, it
can not defend itself with a corporate sham. Another way of stat-
ing the justification for this leg of the rule is that the shareholder
who treats the corporate entity as if it were another aspect of his
personal business can hardly complain if the court treats the
entity as he does.57
2. Improper Purpose
If it is found that the subsidiary has been a mere instrumen-
tality with respect to a particular transaction, the next question
under the Powell rule is whether the parent's domination or con-
trol has been used for fraud or other improper purpose. The un-
derlying rationale of this requirement is that the corporate veil
should not be lightly pierced.5" The use of a corporation as a mere
instrumentality should not give third parties a license to pursue
the defendant unless some actual fraud or other injurious act can
be proven. This policy is defensible, especially in view of the
obvious indefiniteness of the instrumentality rule. While it may
well be argued that the instrumentality test makes piercing a
corporate veil too difficult for a plaintiff, it is also clear that the
ambiguity of the instrumentality test makes it possible to estab-
lish that a corporation was a mere instrumentality in a situation
where there was no improper intent on the part of the shareholder
nor any injurious result. Therefore, in fairness to the parent and
to support the policy of limited liability, improper purpose must
be established before the parent or other dominant party can be
found liable.
a. The Powell approach to improper purpose
The Powell rule, as adopted by Lowendahl, refers to "fraud
or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other posi-
t See HENN, supra note 1, § 147 at 257.
Essentially this represents an allocation of the risk and is particularly justified in
the case of a creditor who voluntarily assumes the risk of dealing with the corporate entity.
Thus, the law requires that he show injustice before the risks shift to the corporation. See
Note, supra note 8, at 1130.
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tive duty, or a dishonest or unjust act. . . ,,"I Other courts have
used the phrase "improper purpose," which we prefer as the gen-
eral term to describe this leg of the Powell rule.'"
This aspect of the rule may best be appreciated by consider-
ation of a case in which the subsidiary was clearly an instrumen-
tality of the parent, yet no improper purpose was found. In Pauley
Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co.,"' Pauley sought a prelimi-
nary injunction which would have required Continental Oil to
cause its wholly-owned subsidiary to cease prosecution of an ac-
tion against Pauley's wholly-owned subsidiary in Mexico. Pau-
ley's theory was that the action in Mexico should be terminated
because of the likelihood that the Mexican courts would make a
wrong choice-of-law decision by applying Mexican law rather
than Delaware law to the contract at issue. The court found that
Continental's subsidiary was in fact a mere instrumentality of
Continental and that it had similarly been an instrumentality of
Pauley prior to its acquisition by Continental Oil.2 Stating that
piercing the veil was appropriate only when required "in the in-
terest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law
or contract, public wrong, or. . .equitable consideration among
members of the corporation require it,""e the court found that
there was a legitimate reason for the existence of Continental's
subsidiary and that the subsidiary was not being used by Conti-
nental for any improper purpose. Specifically, the court found
that it did not know whether Mexican courts would make an
improper choice of law, nor did it know that an application of
1, In POWELL, supra note 1, § 13, the following illustrations of improper purposes are
given:
1. actual fraud;
2. violation of a statute;




7. other cases of wrong or injustice.
For other lists of improper purposes, see generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 136 at
314, and, for specific examples, § 130 at 303 (evasion of contracts and obligations), § 131
at 304 (fraudulent conveyance), § 132 at 305, § 12 at 329 (evasion of statutes), § 141 at
326 (abuse of control). See also FLErcHER, supra note 1, § 43 at 209, § 45.2 at 268.
0 See, e.g., Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
, 43 Del. Ch. 516, 239 A.2d 629 (1968).
62 Id. at 518, 239 A.2d at 631.
03 Id. at 521, 239 A.2d at 633.
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Mexican law would lead to the wrong decision. Accordingly, since
the instrumentality was not being used for any improper purpose,
the court refused to pierce the veil.
b. Alternative approaches to improper purposes
On the other hand, some cases have found an improper pur-
pose rather easily once the initial question of instrumentality has
been resolved. Thus, in Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v.
Oppenstein"4 the court found that an improper purpose was es-
tablished by the undercapitalization or removal of assets from the
subsidiary corporation by the parent-facts which the court also
considered in deciding that the subsidiary was an instrumental-
ity. Citing May Department Stores Co. v. Union Electric Light
& Power Co.,65 the court, in Consolidated Sun Ray, stated:
It does seem, however, that the determination of whether there
is a case for equitable relief could and should be decided by the test
of whether or not the arrangement involved is being used for a proper
purpose. Should not all these other suggested tests be used only as
aids for determining the true purpose of the arrangement? Making
a corporation a supplemental part of an economic unit and operat-
ing it without sufficient funds to meet obligations to those who must
deal with it would be circumstantial evidence tending to show either
an improper purpose or reckless disregard of the rights of others."
Thus, an improper purpose of some sort must be shown, but
such improper purpose may be as general or as vague as impro-
perly capitalizing the subsidiary corporation at its outset. 7 The
use of the subsidiary for the purpose of evading a statute, 8 creat-
ing unjustified procedural roadblocks to legal relief for the plain-
tiff,69 or misrepresenting the state of affairs to a potential plain-
,4 355 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
341 Mo. 299, 107 S.W.2d 41, 54 (1937).
"' Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 1964).
See, e.g., Bernardin Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Cohen v. Williams, 294
Ala. 417, 318 So. 2d 279 (1975).
" Compare United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920) with Westcott Constr.
Corp. v. Cumberland Constr. Co., 328 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1975). See text accompanying
notes 29-32 supra and text accompanying notes 105-13 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 106-08, 155-56, infra. See, e.g., Black & White, Inc.
v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963) and Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich.
App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726 (1970). See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d
1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (holding company allegedly created solely
to protect fraudulently acquired stock from execution of judgment in favor of defrauded
corporation).
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tiff' are other examples of improper purposes. Therefore, the
Powell rule, through its improper purpose requirement, ordinarily
requires that something more than a mere instrumentality be
proven,71 but the plaintiff need not prove the equivalent of com-
mon law fraud.72 Some equitable wrong will usually be sufficient
to show improper purpose.
3. Proximate Cause
The final leg of the Powell rule is that not only must the
plaintiff show instrumentality and an improper purpose, but he
must also show that both the control by the parent and the impro-
per act of the subsidiary have caused him some direct damage.7"
Again, consistent with the general policy to support corporate
limited liability, it is not the intent of the corporate veil doctrine
to grant a hunting license to plaintiffs to redress a general wrong
effected by domination of a corporation. The particular plaintiff
must be able to show that he suffered damages as a result of this
domination.
Thus, in Schlecht v. Equitable Builders, Inc.,74 the trustee of
employee-benefit funds sued the parent of the employer to collect
amounts due to the funds. There was considerable evidence to
show that the assets of the subsidiary had been improperly used
for the benefit of the parent. For example, loans to the parent
were guaranteed by the subsidiary and secured by the assets of
the subsidiary. Nonetheless, the court refused to pierce the veil
because there was no evidence that the control exercised by the
parent or the improper activities of the subsidiary caused an in-
70 See, e.g., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967), and text accompany-
ing notes 115-19 infra.
11 See, e.g., Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments Corp., 386 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
72 See note 10 supra.
"' Powell argues that proximate cause may be lacking either because the complainant
has not been injured by the domination of the corporation or because the complainant
has an adequate remedy without resort to the corporation. See POWELL, supra note 1, at §
14. Acceptance by the complainant of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary,
independence of the subsidiary when the obligation to complainant arose, availability of
the subsidiary for redress, and, according to Powell, the unresolved situation where the
subsidiary is financially able to satisfy a judgment are examples of the absence of proxi-
mate cause. POWELL, supra note 1, at § 15. For resolution of the latter problem in New
York, see Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1, 272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975). Compare Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d
88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971).
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jury to the plaintiff. In fact, the court pointed out that the impro-
per actions had resulted in a Small Business Administration loan
to the parent and that some of the proceeds of such loan had been
paid to the plaintiff. 5 Therefore, the action at issue, even though
performed by an instrumentality of the parent and perhaps being
improper in some respects, was not injurious to the plaintiff.
Thus, the third leg of the Powell rule serves to support the
policy of limited liability by permitting the piercing of the corpo-
rate veil only where equity strictly requires that a particular de-
fendant by reason of that defendant's wrongful acts has caused
injury to the plaintiff. Absent proof of all three legs of the rule,
the plaintiff will not ordinarily be allowed to recover in a jurisdic-
tion following the Powell rule.
II. THE ULTIMATE ISSUES
A. Categorization of the Ultimate Issues
We believe that the courts, whether applying the Powell rule
or some variation or alternative, are essentially concerned with
certain ultimate issues which can be identified in the cases. We
know, however, of no successful effort to integrate all of these
issues into a single simple rule which incorporates the proper
considerations with sufficient specificity to insure uniformity and
predictability of application.76 In this equitable area involving as
wide a variety of situations as foolishness or deviousness can con-
trive, there appears to be no single determinative factor. The
relative importance and usefulness of various factors will vary
from case to case, but at least the relevant factors or ultimate
issues can be identified to some extent.
To some degree, courts pay lip service to the Powell rule and
the circumstances evidencing instrumentality, or to some alter-
native rule or analysis, while actually basing their decisions on
one or more of the ultimate underlying issues." In other cases, the
courts attempt to apply in an inflexible mechanical way the Pow-
ell rule or some other rule and thereby arrive at what may not be
a sound decision.8
' 272 Or. 92, 95, 535 P.2d 86, 89 (1975).
7 See note 46 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974)
and United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A.
1974).
"' See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert.
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We believe that it is useful to attempt to identify and analyze
some of the ultimate issues which underlie the better-reasoned
decisions. Such ultimate issues may be considered in three cate-
gories.
1. Necessary Preconditions
There appear to be three necessary preconditions for a corpo-
rate veil case. These preconditions also exist in many cases where
piercing the veil would not be appropriate. Therefore, such condi-
tions usually provide only a basis for moving forward to the sec-
ond level of inquiry. They are not determinative in and of them-
selves. Such factors are: dominance of what we call a "subser-
vient corporation" by some party to whom we refer as the "domi-
nant party;" a beneficial interest by the dominant party in the
subservient corporation; and an injury to the plaintiff reasonably
related to the defendant's dominance of the subservient corpo-
ration.
2. Improper Purposes
In order to justify piercing the veil there should be some
showing of improper purpose in addition to establishment of the
preconditions. These improper acts may be categorized as viola-
tions of public policy, misrepresentation, lack of economic sub-
stance, participation, and what we have labelled as "joint impro-
per acts."79
3. Policy Considerations
Finally, it would appear that there are policy considerations
which are utilized by the courts in a close case. We assume, of
course, that the traditional equitable considerations and the
strong policy in favor of preserving corporate limited liability will
always be involved. However, the particular additional policy
considerations which the courts appear to use in the corporate
veil area are the questions of who should bear the risk of loss and
what degree of legitimacy exists for claiming the limited liability
protection of a corporation.
It should be admitted that any attempt to categorize the
factors is somewhat arbitrary and artificial. At all times it should
denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
,' For other categories of improper purposes, see note 59 supra.
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be borne in mind that these factors are closely related and that
they tend to merge imperceptibly into one another. Nonetheless,
we believe that there is some usefulness in trying to untangle
them for a brief examination. We will, therefore, discuss the pro-
posed headings separately below.
B. Preconditions
1. Beneficial Interest
The Powell analysis was directed only at parent-subsidiary
relationships, presumably because there was perceived no need to
establish the liability of a nonshareholder. Stock ownership, how-
ever, is not an absolute requirement for piercing the veil. A more
precise requirement is that the dominant party must have some
beneficial interest in the subservient corporation. Thus, for exam-
ple, in Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp.,0 the
defendant had an option to acquire the subservient corporation
but no actual stock ownership. However, pursuant to contractual
agreements, the optionee had effective control over the subser-
vient corporation and a beneficial interest because of its right to
purchase the company. In connection with other factors, it was
found that the dominant party was in fact liable for certain ac-
tions taken through the instrumentality of the subservient corpo-
ration. Similarly, in Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Dis-
tillers & Chemical Corp.,"' a creditor was sued on a piercing-the-
corporate-veil theory. There, the court held for the defendant on
other grounds, but acknowledged that the defendant could be
liable by reason of its position as a creditor and its exercise of
certain control rights over the debtor corporation.
Thus, the test is whether or not the defendant has some
beneficial interest in the subservient corporation, as a share-
holder, creditor, potential shareholder, or conceivably, in other
respects. The better view in support of corporate limited liability
and judicial economy would, however, seem to require some such
beneficial interest. Otherwise there would be a potential for suits
against parties with only remote relationships with the corporate
wrongdoer.
11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355 (1974).
483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
VOL. 55
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
2. Domination
The next precondition is effective domination over the sub-
servient corporation by the dominant party. This is basically the
same question as is addressed by the first leg of the Powell test.82
Many cases appear to be decided almost exclusively on whether
or not the requisite degree of domination exists.8" However, this
merely demonstrates that instrumentality is the most difficult
aspect of most corporate veil cases, not that it is the only issue.
If domination cannot be proven, there is no basis for going for-
ward to other issues. If domination is proven, the very facts which
establish it often demonstrate the other attributes necessary to
pierce the veil.
Consider, for example, a fairly typical opinion with an ex-
tended discussion of the domination which established that a
subsidiary was a mere instrumentality. In Consolidated Sun Ray,
Inc. v. Oppenstein, 84 there was an action by a landlord to recover
damages for breach of a lease against both the subsidiary which
had entered into the lease and the parent corporation, Consoli-
dated Sun Ray. In determining that the subsidiary was so domi-
nated by the parent as to be a mere instrumentality, the court
found that Consolidated had exclusive control over the subsidi-
ary's bank account, that it pledged the subsidiary's accounts re-
ceivable for its own loans, that the subsidiary had no independent
discretion with respect to buying and merchandising, that the
parent in its own name made arrangements for insurance and
advertising on behalf of the subsidiary without any indication of
consultation with the subsidiary, and that the two companies had
common officers and directors. 85 The court then determined that
the parent was liable for the subsidiary's lease obligations with-
out such an elaborate discussion of the other requirements for
piercing the veil. But note that the facts showing domination also
show misrepresentation and undercapitalization, 6 thereby elimi-
nating the need for detailed analysis on those issues.
12 See note 52 supra.
See, e.g., Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975); Chatterley v.
Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971).
335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964).
" Id. at 804-05.
See Ampex v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974); see text
accompanying notes 168-75 infra.
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The degree of domination which must be shown varies and,
for example, may depend on the force of the other equitable argu-
ments in favor of piercing the veil. Thus, in Fisser v. International
Bank,"7 the court refused to find that a subsidiary corporation was
so dominated as to be a mere instrumentality where the parent-
defendant had negotiated for a ship charter on behalf of the sub-
sidiary, had formed and capitalized the subsidiary, and had cho-
sen all of the subsidiary's officers and directors. The facts seemed
clearly to indicate the presence of virtually all of the Powell
''circumstances," including the fact that the subsidiary existed
exclusively for the benefit of the parent." But the court also found
that the plaintiffs knew that they were dealing with a controlled,
undercapitalized subsidiary and that they therefore could not
hold the parent liable for the subsidiary's inability to perform the
contract. 9
On the other hand, in Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc.,'" the
court found only very general evidence that the shareholder was
the "investing and directing force of both corporations."', How-
ever, in that case, the corporation had engaged in an outrageous
line of conduct with respect to the plaintiff, repossessing his truck
without justification, converting certain of his tools and personal
property, charging him a repossession fee based on its promise to
return the truck, and then still refusing to return it. In view of
the conduct of the corporation, the court determined with rela-
tively little analysis that the individual shareholder should be
found liable for the corporation's activities.92
The issue of effective domination is one that will often in-
volve a subjective determination by the courts. It is possible that
such determination will turn to a substantial degree on the
court's reaction to the other facts of the case. As a general rule,
,7 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
" Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 239. See also Chengelis v. Cenco Instruments, 386 F. Supp. 862 (D. Pa. 1975)
(instrumentality but no fraud because of creditor's knowledge); Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191
So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
90 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974).
,Id. at 343, 526 P.2d at 336.
92 Id. at 344, 526 P.2d at 336. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (court pierced veil to hold that its jurisdiction
over Vesco gave it jurisdiction over a holding company formed by him solely for the
purpose of holding the stock he received as a result of his alleged fraud on the plaintiff).
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domination should be addressed as a threshold question; if it is
found to exist, one can then move on to the issue of whether the
domination was used for an improper purpose. But one should be
aware that the degree of domination which the plaintiff must
prove will frequently be dependent on the equity of his overall
position.
3. Relationship to Injury
The final precondition is that there be some reasonable rela-
tionship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the ac-
tions of the defendant. In the Lowendahl adoption of the Powell
rule this is put in terms of "wrongful acts resulting from the
parent's domination being the proximate cause of plaintiff's
loss. 93 We submit that this is too restrictive a rule. For example,
in those cases discussed below, under Joint Improper Acts, it
appears that it is sufficient to show some knowing or cooperative
effort between the related parties which results in unjust injury
to the plaintiff,94 even though it may not be possible to prove that
the defendant's control directly caused plaintiff's injury.
Although there may be doubt as to the exact scope of this
causation or relationship requirement, the principle of some rea-
sonable connection between plaintiff's injury and the action of
the defendant seems both morally and logically sound. Thus, in
the Schlecht case,15 the mere fact that the defendant improperly
dominated its subsidiary and caused it to perform improper acts
was insufficient to allow the particular plaintiffs to pierce the veil
absent a showing that such plaintiffs were injured by such acts.96
,1 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1936). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
Another way of stating this requirement is that the defendant's domination must be shown
to harm the plaintiff in the particular transaction at issue. See generally FLETCHER, supra
note 1, § 43 at 209; Hamilton, supra note 22, at 990-91. Compare Bernardin, Inc. v.
Midland Oil Co., 520 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1975) (court pierced veil because improper
purpose related to particular transaction) with Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247
App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 79 (1936).
" See text accompanying notes 142-51 infra.
272 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975).
An interesting variation on this concept is demonstrated by Pilot Title Ins. Co. v.
Northwestern Bank, 11 N.C. App. 144, 181 S.E.2d 799 (1971). There, Northwestern Bank
obtained a mortgagee's title policy to secure a purported debt of a subservient corporation.
The title company prevailed in a declaratory judgment on the title policy on the basis that
the subservient corporation's veil could be pierced to show that the bank had no true
economic interest in enforcing the policy. Thus there was no injury to the bank because
the subsidiary's veil could be pierced.
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This rule-that no plaintiff may avoid corporate limited liability
unless he can prove injury resulting from misuse of the corpora-
tion-supports the strong policy of limited liability and offers
some assurance that the plaintiff has standing to complain,
thereby tending to discourage frivolous claims.
C. Improper Purposes
The heart of most corporate veil cases, explicitly or implic-
itly, is that a corporation has been used for such an improper
purpose that equity will permit its corporate form to be disre-
garded. 7 The types of situations in which such improper activi-
ties arise can be classified under five headings: 8 Violations of
public policy including evasion of statutes; misrepresentation,
which should be understood to encompass a wider range of ac-
tions than common law fraud; lack of economic substance which
subsumes a variety of misconduct; participation, including inter-
vention and direction of the corporation's wrongful acts; and joint
D See notes 6-7 supra.
Another type of improper purpose of factor which courts and commentators often
mention is the failure of the corporation to engage in proper formalities (holding annual
meetings recorded in minutes, etc.). See HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258, and Hamilton,
supra note 22, at 990. We suspect that the theoretical origins of this approach may be
somewhat related to defective incorporation-that is, to a concept that the subservient
corporation does not validly exist if it does not have proper meetings, records, and other
formal procedures just as it would not exist if it failed to file its articles of incorporation.
We contend that such an approach is theoretically unsound; witness the failure of most
corporate statutes to penalize a corporation for such failures. For example, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-4-111 (1973) requires an annual shareholder meeting but provides that failure
to hold such a meeting will not work a forfeiture or dissolution of the corporation. See also
DE. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 91 (McKinney 1963). On the other
hand, a Colorado corporation may be declared defunct for failure to file its annual report
or pay its franchise fees. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-10-109 (1973). For similar provisions,
see CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 502 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
§ 91 (McKinney 1963). Likewise, a corporation may be dissolved for failure to maintain a
registered agent. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1504 (West 1977); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 7-8-113
(1973); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 136 (1974). It may thus be implied that a corporation should
not cease to exist for technical violations other than those for which the statutes provide
such a remedy.
No doubt a failure to follow formalities may be somewhat indicative of treatment of
the corporation as a mere instrumentality. It may also have some tendency to mislead
third parties. However, insofar as there is any valid significance in corporate formalities
which are not required by statute as conditions to continued corporate existence, such
significance is adequately recognized by the misrepresentation issue. See text accompany-
ing notes 110-28 infra. For other criticism of the rise of the "formalities" consideration in
piercing the corporate veil, see Carolan supra note 4, at 186 (inappropriate for small
corporation), Note, supra note 8, at 1126.
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improper acts, an admittedly elusive concept which we will en-
deavor to clarify.9
These categories are discussed separately below.
1. Violations of Public Policy
The origin of the corporate veil doctrine and some of the
continued strong bases of the theory arise as a result of violations
or evasions of some statute or other strong public policy through
the instrumentality of a subservient corporation. 00 United States
u. Reading Co.' is an early example of such misuse of the corpo-
rate form.
In Zale Corp. & Corrigan-Republic, Inc. v. FTC,12 the
court upheld an FTC cease-and-desist order relating to violation
of Regulation 2. Such order affected Zale Corporation and a net-
work of 1056 wholly owned subsidiaries. In piercing the corporate
veil to hold Zale responsible for the actions of all of the subsidiar-
ies, the court found that the violations of Regulation 2 were for
the use of a form prepared by Zale and distributed to the subsidi-
ary for its use, that advertising for the stores was done in the
name of the total enterprise, and that the nature of the parent-
subsidiary organization denied recognition of the separate corpo-
rate structure of the subsidiaries. Thus, for the court to recognize
the legitimacy of the separate corporations would frustrate the
statutory policy underlying Regulation 2.
In an interesting Texas case, 03 a local statute prevented busi-
nesses from being open on consecutive weekends. Sundaco, Inc.,
an apparently resourceful organization, formed a wholly owned
subsidiary to which it leased its premises on alternate weekends
on the theory that two separate corporations had the right to do
business on consecutive weekends. Viewing this as a transparent
attempt to evade public policy the court pierced the veil.
In United States v. Ira S. Bushen & Sons, Inc. ,04 the court
" For categorizations of other commentators, see note 57 supra.
"' See note 7 supra.
101 253 U.S. 26 (1920). See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
.02 473 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1973).
02 Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
10, 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973). See also Bruhn's Freezer Meats v. Department of
Agriculture, 438 F.2d 1332, 1343 (8th Cir. 1971) (court upheld cease and desist orders
against individuals who owned the corporation which in turn owned all the stock of
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pierced the veil of approximately 40 subsidiaries, each of which
owned a separate vessel, to enjoin the parent from failing to com-
ply with regulations designed to prevent oil spills. The court em-
phasized the control of the subsidiaries by the parent, the fact
that the parent profited from their activities and the strong pub-
lic interest in avoiding oil spills. The court also stressed its con-
cern that the parent might attempt to evade regulations by creat-
ing additional subsidiaries if the corporate forms were not
pierced. In the case of United States v. Wood,'"5 reversed on ap-
peal, the Customs Court held that the corporate veil could be
pierced when it determined that a Canadian corporation had es-
tablished an American subsidiary for the purpose of reselling its
goods to such subsidiary in the United States at a low price in
order to reduce import duties.108
There are also a vast number of intriguing cases in which
there have been attempts to avoid not a particular statute but a
general public policy. Thus, in a number of cases which can be
referred to as distributorship cases, large companies have set up
a two-tier corporate structure whereby a wholly owned subsidiary
manufactures products which are sold by the parent or the parent
manufactures the products and distributes them through a sub-
sidiary.07 The purpose of such arrangements appears to be to
complicate the task of a plaintiff in a products liability suit who
may have jurisdiction over the distributor but a claim against
only the manufacturer. The courts have almost uniformly pierced
the veil in such situations. There have also been a number of
instances in which the courts have disregarded the corporate form
where it appeared that a separate corporation was being used for
an inequitable procedural purpose, for example, to allow a statute
of limitations to run.'
08
corporate defendants charged with violations of the Packers & Stockyards Act; if the court
restrained only the corporate defendants, its order "would prove futile as the corporations
could be dissolved and the individual petitioners could then, under the cloak of new
corporations, engage in the proscribed activities and thereby frustrate the purposes of the
Act.").
,, 366 F. Supp. 1074 (1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
10 366 F. Supp. at 1085.
,07 See, e.g., Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967); Shirley
v. Dracket Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 182 N.W.2d 726 (1970).
in See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love, 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963). Black
& White concealed its defense-that the tort was committed by an employee of Checker
in a cab owned by Checker-until the statute of limitations had run on Checker.
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On the other hand, there is clearly a limit to how far the
courts will go simply because there is a technical evasion of some
statute or rule of public policy which has no clear moral purpose
and where the corporate structure may be justified on other
grounds. For example, in Westcott Construction Corp. v. Cum-
berland Construction Co.,101 there appeared to be an inadvert-
ent evasion of a technical local statute. Westcott sought a de-
claratory judgment to determine that its bid on a public project
was acceptable where such bid had not included, as required by
statute, a sub-bid by a corporation controlled by Westcott. West-
cott had not included the sub-bid because it had chosen to sub-
contract the work on this particular project to a lower bidder. The
court held that there was no basis for piercing the veil simply to
enforce a rule that was not intended to apply to such circum-
stances and where there was no evidence that Westcott was at-
tempting to evade any legitimate concern of public policy. Thus,
although there is a strong tendency to look through the corporate
form to enforce public policy rules of a substantial nature, such
tendency is usually limited to willful attempts to evade malum
in rem rules. Corporate veil misrepresentation must be under-
stood to constitute something quite distinct from common law
misrepresentation."0
2. Misrepresentation
The misrepresentation issue sometimes is confusing because
of the tendency of courts to use fraud language in ruling on corpo-
rate veil matters. Clearly, if the plaintiff in such cases had a good
fraud claim he would plead it, but in most cases this is not done.
Fraud cases are difficult to prove, and the quantum of evidence
available in most corporate veil cases is considerably smaller than
would be required to carry the burden on a fraud claim."'
Thus, in Paumier v. Barge B.T. 1073,112 Zapetis, the sole
shareholder of the corporation, was held personally liable for ex-
penses incurred in connection with a salvage operation of a tug
328 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
,,0 Although judicial use of the word "misrepresentation" seems too well established
to be displaced, some alternative term such as "misleading," "passive misrepresen-
tation," or "corporate veil misrepresentation" might avoid some confusion.
See note 10 supra.
" 395 F. Supp. 1019 (1974). See also Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Stuard, 406
F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1969) (misrepresentation to employee).
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leased by his corporation. The court found that Zapetis had ad-
vised the creditor in question that the barge pledged as security
for the expenses incurred in the salvage operation was owned by
OSC, a corporation controlled by Zapetis, when in fact OSC did
not own the barge. At the time he made this statement Zapetis
knew that the corporation did not own the barge and had no other
substantial assets."' However, he made the representation in
good faith based on his belief that he could arrange for a security
interest with the owner of the barge, a defense which would pre-
sumably have been valid in a fraud case. However, the court held
that such a defense was inadequate in a corporate veil case:
Counsel urges that since Zapetis acted in good faith we should not
hold him liable. The good faith argued for is that when Zapetis
pledged the Barge he fully expected that GMC would stand behind
him. We feel that Zapetis' good faith is immaterial. Although quite
different on the facts, in a case involving going behind the corporate
entity, the Supreme Court stated that good faith was irrelevant as
long as the parties intended to do what they did .... The principle
is applicable in the case before us. If good faith were to become a
defense in actions of this type, every defendant would claim good
faith of some sort even though he did exactly what he intended to
do in misrepresenting certain facts to an innocent party. This is not
an action for common law misrepresentation in which scienter must
be proven. That distinction must be made. The corporate identity
can be pierced to prevent not only fraud, but any injustice."'
Other interesting cases go even farther, suggesting that con-
fusion, absent a positive misrepresentation, is a basis for piercing
the corporate veil. For example, in My Bread Baking Co. v. Cum-
berland Farms, Inc.," 5 the plaintiff had sold products to various
subsidiaries owned by the principal defendant. In seeking to re-
cover from the parent for the refusal of the subsidiaries to return
certain property to it, the plaintiff proved, among other things,
"3 395 F. Supp. at 1039.
" Id. Zapetis' good faith might have been difficult to prove. In addition to his misre-
presentation to Brawley as to the ownership of the tug, Zapetis through OSC refused to
pay Brawley when Brawley presented the bill for $53,101.81 to OSC. Then Zapetis agreed
to have Ship Sales Corp., another corporation he controlled, lend Brawley $500 to prose-
cute his claim against OSC, in exchange for 50% of whatever Brawley recovered!
" 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968). This case also demonstrates the close inter-
relationship of the various ultimate issues. Although the case involved elements of corpo-
rate veil misrepresentation, there were also elements of agency-like intervention in the
form of direct instructions given to employees of the various corporations by the dominant
individual of Cumberland Farms.
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that the affiliated corporations used a common name, operated
out of the same office, and otherwise caused confusion to the
parties dealing with them as to the identity of the responsible
corporation. The court accordingly held the parent liable for the
claims against all of the subsidiaries."'
In Zaist v. Olson"7 there was a somewhat similar situation
with the added factor that the subservient corporation was, in the
view of the court's majority,"8 undercapitalized. Mr. Olson oper-
ated through several corporations, including the debtor East
Haven. Olson used the services and supplies of the plaintiff on a
number of substantial real estate projects, including some hous-
ing developments and a shopping center. Although statements for
such work were originally sent to Olson individually, he directed,
and the plaintiff agreed, to send the bills to East Haven. When
Olson ran into financial difficulties, it was found that all of the
real property and most of the other assets of his real estate empire
were owned by him or other related corporations and that East
Haven was a virtual shell. In view of the fact that the activities
of the corporations were hopelessly mixed up, that they all oper-
ated out of the same offices, and that Olson never clearly indi-
cated to the plaintiff what the differences among the various
entities were, the plaintiff was permitted to recover against Olson
individually.'
Misrepresentation requires some of the most difficult balanc-
ing decisions which arise in this area of the law. On the one hand
is the strong policy of preserving corporate limited liability. On
the other is the unsophisticated general creditor such as Zaist
who thinks he has good reason to believe that he is dealing with
a debtor with substantial assets. Note that the plaintiff in such
cases is rarely a sophisticated lender who would insist on personal
' The principal shareholders of the defendant corporations had apparently in-
structed the subsidiaries not to return the racks, which act gave rise to this suit. Id. at
615, 233 N.E.2d at 749.
"' 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967).
'l' Id. at 577, 227 A.2d at 559.
A strongly worded dissent suggests that even though Olson conducted his business
in a "free and easy" fashion, he did not use the corporation unjustly in contravention of
the plaintiff's rights. It noted that East Haven had paid the plaintiffs $169,652.66 over a
period of years and was unable to pay the $23,000 (exclusive of interest) in question here
because of the general financial decline of the early 1960's. Heavily influenced by the
necessity of limited liability, the dissent chided the majority for its failure to require a
stronger showing of improper purpose. Id. at 580-83, 227 A.2d at 560-61.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
guarantees and collateral; he is usually a small businessman who
should not, as a matter of policy, be required to investigate his
debtors or incur the legal expenses of securing his trade receiva-
bles.'10
The relevant balancing procedures should, therefore, include
not only the usual consideration of the ultimate issues but also
questions of the relative sophistication of the parties and the
legitimate business expectations and practices of the parties.
Where other factors are favorable to the plaintiff, it is equitable
to pierce the veil based on a much lesser degree of misrepresen-
tation than would be required for common law fraud, provided
that there is at least some action by the defendant which encour-
ages plaintiff's misapprehension. 2 ' Compare Fisser v. Interna-
tional Bank,22 where gross undercapitalization and possible par-
ticipation in a breach of contract by the parent did not cause the
veil to be pierced because the parent had advised third parties of
its relationship with the subsidiary and the nature of the subsidi-
ary's assets and purposes.
3. Lack of Economic Substance
Many cases have used undercapitalization as the primary
basis for piercing the corporate veil. At least in some of the Cali-
fornia cases, it appears that gross undercapitalization by itself
will be sufficient to pierce the veil. 2 3 On the other hand, most
jurisdictions follow the rule that while undercapitalization raises
very serious questions, there must be some additional factor in
order to justify disregarding the corporate entity.
24
"I Most commentators have taken the position that tort victims should be able to
pierce the corporate veil on a weaker showing than creditors because only creditors volun-
tarily assume the risk of doing business with the corporate entity. See note 22 supra. It
seems to us that creditors who have behaved reasonably and who have not knowingly
assumed the risks-because of their lack of financial sophistication-should not be held
to the higher standard.
"' See, e.g., Elvalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 450, 525 P.2d 105, 109
(1974) (creditor dealt with general manager of parent in negotiating deal with subsidiary);
Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs. Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 24, 320 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1974)
(undercapitalization and defendant had in past paid creditor for debts of its subsidiary);
Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 726-27, 524 P.2d
1355, 1359 (1974) (representations by parent that it was behind the subsidiary and under-
capitalization-subsidiary's bank account kept near zero balance).
"2 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
"2 See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
124 See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960). Compare
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As a starting point, lack of economic substance should be
understood to cover a variety of evils' 5 in addition to undercapi-
talization. First, it includes traditional undercapitalization, set-
ting up a new corporation with capital that is clearly inadequate
for the needs of the business. 2 Secondly, it includes cases, closely
akin to fraudulent transfers, where a shareholder milks all of the
assets out of the corporation.'"2 Finally, lack of economic sub-
stance includes operating a corporation unprofitably or having
the corporation do business exclusively with the dominant party,




FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191 with HENN, supra note 1, § 146 n.16 & 17 at 253.
See Carolan, supra note 4, for Florida practice.
"I5 See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 1, § 129 at 302-03, § 137 at 314-15; FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 44.1 at 249; HENN, supra note 1, § 148 at 258-59. In FLETCHER, supra note
1, § 44.1 at 249, it is stated that:
It is coming to be recognized as the policy of the law that stockholders should
in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered capital reasonably
adequate for its prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss, this is ground
for denying the separate entity privilege.
26 An example of traditional undercapitalization is Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super.
351, 263 A.2d 188 (1970). In that case, the receiver of Mar Building Co., Inc. (Mar), an
insolvent construction corporation, sought to pierce the corporate veil of Mar to hold
Middlesex Apt., Inc., (Middlesex), the owner of the realty, responsible for obligation due
from Mar to certain creditors. The sole asset of Mar was a contract whereby Mar was to
construct an apartment building for Middlesex for $680,000. In the opinion of the court,
the construction cost would far exceed $680,000. (One expert had suggested the reasonable
cost would have been $900,000). In piercing the veil of Mar to hold Middlesex liable to
the creditors, the courts stressed that this scheme was "all too often seen," that it was
inequitable for the incorporators of Middlesex to "grow fat on the work of laborors," and
that Middlesex had recognized its responsibility to the creditors by undertaking to negoti-
ate with them on behalf of Mar. See also Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344
(2d Cir. 1942). But see Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127
N.E.2d 832 (1955). See, e.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th
Cir. 1920); Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs. Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974);
see Hamilton, supra note 22, at 986. State legislatures have been reluctant to define
adequate capitalization in any helpful way. The statutes that do require minimum paid-
in capital as a condition precedent to doing business typically require token amounts. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.47 (1975) ($1,000), OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.04
(Page:1964) ($500), TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02 (Vernon:1956) ($1,000).
I" See Note, supra note 8, at 1129, for more specific examples (such as causing the
payment of unwarranted dividends, exacting unreasonable management charges).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.),
aff'd., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (net profits of all
subsidiaries remitted to parent by dividends); Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super. 351, 363
A.2d 188 (1970); Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W.
979 (1916), cited in Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 203.
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The first category should be fairly clear although there are
obvious difficulties in determining what constitutes adequate
capital in a particular case. An example of the second category
is Bernandin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp.,' 9 where a creditor of a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Midland pierced the subsidiary's veil
to recover against Midland. In that case, the subsidiary's plant
had burned down and the parent received the insurance proceeds.
An officer of the parent served as liquidator for the business, and
all liquidation proceeds were paid directly to the parent. The
plaintiff was therefore allowed to recover from Midland.
a. Unprofitable operation
The more interesting and perhaps challenging cases arise
where the subsidiary is operated on a basis which does not permit
it to make an adequate profit. Thus, in United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., 31 the Government brought an action against Reserve
Mining Co., Armco, and Republic Steel Corporation based on
violations of environmental laws by Reserve. The specific action
arose out of government efforts to terminate the discharge of ta-
conite tailings into the air and into the water of Lake Superior.
The court determined that Armco and Republic owned all of the
stock of Reserve on a fifty-fifty basis and effectively dominated
its board of directors and policymaking procedures. The court
then emphasized that Reserve dealt exclusively with Armco and
Republic, that its debts were guaranteed by the parent compa-
nies, and that Armco and Republic never bought Reserve's prod-
ucts at market price. Instead, they simply reimbursed Reserve for
its production costs so that all of the "profits" of the enterprise
were enjoyed by the parent corporations. In view of the large
potential liability involved in the case and the belief of the court
that Reserve was being used to shield the parents from the conse-
quences of their polluting activities, the veil of the subsidiary was
pierced.
The Reserve case exemplifies the interrelationship of the var-
ious factors. Lack of economic substance-in this case the con-
duct of the business in an unprofitable manner-was not the sole
basis for the decision. However, when combined with strong evi-
" 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975).
" 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975).
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dence that Reserve was totally dominated by the parents and the
fact that Reserve was engaged in activities contrary to public
policy, the court reached the conclusion that the veil should be
pierced.
b. Undercapitalization as the sole criterion
A great deal of attention has been devoted to lack of eco-
nomic substance, usually in the form of undercapitalization, in-
cluding suggestions that this should be the sole criterion in some
cases.' It has also been proposed that courts should determine
what would constitute adequate capitalization and then hold the
shareholders liable for an amount up to but not to exceed such
adequate capitalization. 32 Finally, the suggestion has been made
that plaintiffs in tort cases should be permitted to pierce the
corporate veil if the corporation has inadequate capital and inad-
equate insurance. 1
We object to most of these proposals and submit that, with
the possible exception of California, they have found little accept-
ance in the courts. 134 Cases which seem to use undercapitalization
as an exclusive test often involve fact situations where there is at
least an implied misrepresentation or other reasons for piercing
the veil. 3 15 Absent such factors, there is no reason why parties
should not knowingly deal with a corporation, understanding that
ultimate payment may be contingent on the corporation's suc-
cess, and, because of that knowledge, be precluded from piercing
the veil should the corporation be unsuccessful.
37
We would further submit that the courts are not totally com-
petent to determine what adequate capitalization should be for
a particular business.3 8 To give them not only the task of deciding
"' See note 123 supra.
M2 See Salomon, Limited Limited Liability: A Definitive Judicial Standard for the
Inadequate Capitalization Problem, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 321 (1974); Carolan, supra note 4.
'13 See Comment, supra note 4.
11 See note 124 supra.
'3' See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563,
227 A.2d 552 (1967); Evalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 525 P.2d 105 (1974);
Ampex Corp. v. Office Elecs., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974).
"' See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) (initial capitalization
$500); Tiernan v. Sheldon, 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 166). See note 89 supra.
IS? But see text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
' But see Salmon, supra note 132, at 337-38 and Carolan, supra note 4, at 193-95.
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that a company is undercapitalized but the further assignment
of determining what the amount of equity should have been at
some time in the past seems to us unreasonable. Moreover, if the
purpose of such a policy is to encourage investors to capitalize
corporations adequately, such purpose is hardly served by a pen-
alty which limits shareholder exposure to an amount not to ex-
ceed what they should have invested in the first place.'
Finally, we submit that a policy of piercing the veil in every
tort action where the corporation is inadequately insured and
capitalized elevates the rights of tort victims above the public
interest in limited liability. 140 How much insurance cost would a
corporation have to incur to assure its shareholders that they
would never be liable for some unforeseen but expensive tort? 4'
We would contend that if investors are to continue to provide
equity for high risk activities, the general policy of corporate lim-
ited liability must be preserved. Of course, undercapitalization
with respect to the predictable needs of the business, combined
with some slight degree of other inequitable conduct, should con-
tinue to provide a basis for piercing the veil.
4. Participation
The concept of participation or direction, treating the sub-
servient corporation in an agencylike way, is a common feature
in corporate veil cases. Thus, in the My Bread' case it was shown
that the controlling shareholder of the Cumberland Bread Com-
Our point is not to criticize the abilities of the courts but to indicate that the determina-
tion of how much capital is necessary at a given time for a given business is an issue ill-
suited for any adjudicative process. The courts may properly find that a given amount of
capital was inadequate and-in conjunction with other factors-use this as a basis for
piercing the veil. They should not however have the task of making the much more
difficult decision of how much capital would have been enough.
131 For analysis of the different policy considerations in this area for the creditor and
tort victim, see Hamilton, supra note 22, at 986-89.
I" Such a policy would, in effect, make all corporations insurers for the benefit of the
general public. It seems improper that such a far reaching policy change should be made
through the medium of the corporate veil doctrine. It further appears discriminatory to
give such insurance protection to the victims of corporate torts as opposed to other classes
of tort victims.
" ' See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), where the court noted that the
eventual judgments might be in the neighborhood of $100 million. See also text accompa-
nying note 130 supra.
112 My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748
(1968). See text accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
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pany had effectively dominated the affairs of both the primary
and the affiliated corporations and that in fact he had ordered
certain of the subsidiary corporations not to return display cases
to the plaintiff. The basis for piercing the corporate veil in that
case was therefore that the controlling shareholder was directly
participating in or directing the subsidiaries' wrongful conversion
of plaintiff's property.
In such direct-intervention cases, the basis of liability may
often be agency and there may be a direct claim against the
dominant party. As in other cases, however, the corporate veil
doctrine presents a better evidentiary case for the plaintiff be-
cause of the difficulty of proving express agency.
Consider, for example, House of Koscot Development Corp.
v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc. 3 There, Koscot sued Glenn W.
Turner as controlling shareholder of American Line because of a
breach of contract by American Line. The court found that
Turner was directly involved, without going through any corpo-
rate formalities, in hiring and firing employees and making other
corporate decisions. Indeed, Turner apparently directed the par-
ticular breach of contract in question and was arguably acting as
a principal or a participant in the breach. Therefore, he was found
personally liable for the corporation's activities. Note that
Turner's hiring and firing of corporate employees did not neces-
sarily make the employees or the corporation agents of Turner.
Such actions did, however, form part of the basis for piercing the
veil.
The comparison between agency and corporate veil parti-
cipation is similar to the comparison between common law fraud
and corporate veil misrepresentation in that the facts establish-
ing the respective types of claims are similar but the plaintiff's
burden of proof is somewhat less onerous in the corporate veil
theory. " '
5. Joint Improper Acts
a. Some illustrative cases
A final and particularly interesting category of improper acts
14 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).
' For a general discussion of the distinction between the agency and corporate veil
theories, see note 9 supra.
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exists when two'parties, the dominant party and the subservient
corporation, cooperate to perform some series of actions which, if
all such actions were performed by either of them alone, would
create liability. In Professional Beauty, Inc. v. Gay,"' a salesman
entered into a contract whereby he was given the exclusive right
to commissions on the employer's products in a specific geo-
graphic area. The employer thereafter created a subsidiary corpo-
ration to sell products in the same area. The court determined
that the sales by the subsidiary constituted a breach of the con-
tract of the parent with the employee.
Similarly, in McDonald Co. v. Kemper,46 the principal as-
set of the parent corporation was a piece of real estate. The
corporation entered into an agreement with Kemper giving him
exclusive brokerage rights to the property. Kemper then found a
purchaser who, at the suggestion of the corporation's shareholder,
ultimately purchased the stock of the corporation rather than the
real estate thereby attempting to evade the brokerage fee. Kem-
per sued for his commission and the court found in his favor. Note
that in such a case as this there is no suggestion that the domi-
nant party directed the corporation to do anything; yet there is
clearly inequitable conduct.
By contrast, in Tiernan v. Sheldon"' an individual lessee,
pursuant to a ninety-nine year lease, had the right to assign his
lease to any party without the approval of the lessor. The lessee
formed a wholly owned corporation without any significant capi-
tal, assigned the lease to it and thereby relieved himself of any
lease obligation. The court rejected an effort by the lessor to
pierce the veil and hold the individual liable on the lease. One
can only conclude that the court decided that a lessor who signed
a lease permitting an assignment to anyone at the lessee's discre-
tion, and without further liability of the lessee, must have had
fair warning that the lease could be assigned to an insolvent
party. 148
45 463 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
... 386 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
14" 191 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
41 See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) for a similar example.
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b. Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
A variation in structure is demonstrated in Berger v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc.' CBS Films, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of CBS, developed pilot films and other projects for
sale to CBS or other outlets. The directors of Films were em-
ployees of CBS as were many of the officers of Films. The testi-
mony showed that lines of executive authority flowed from Films
to or through executives at CBS and that CBS employees re-
garded Films as a "division" of CBS. The opinion indicates that
CBS effectively controlled, or at least had the ability to control,
Films, and therefore had access to projects developed by the sub-
sidiary without any general responsibility for its actions.
In 1965, the plaintiff contacted Films to discuss his idea for
an annual fashion show. A Mr. Levitan, a CBS executive, accom-
panied a Films' representative to Las Vegas, viewed Berger's
show and expressed interest in using his idea for an annual televi-
sion production. Thereafter, Films entered into a contract with
Berger obtaining a right of first refusal for television rights to the
fasion show. Subsequently, a Mr. Cowley from a New York model
agency approached Mr. Levitan and sold CBS a substantially
similar idea. Berger then sued CBS on the theory that its transac-
tion with Cowley breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing of the contract between Berger and Films. The trial
court entered judgment for Berger based on its determination
that Films was a mere instrumentality of CBS; the appellate
court reversed, holding that the instrumentality test of Lowen-
dahl had not been satisfied.
It appears that Films acquired the right of first refusal be-
cause Levitan, on behalf of CBS, liked the fashion show idea. It
may fairly be inferred that CBS rarely entered into contracts for
pilot shows directly and that CBS had established Films in part
for the purpose of developing new shows. It further appears that
because of CBS's effective control of Films, the contract between
Films and Berger for all practical purposes gave CBS a right of
first refusal on the Berger production. In refusing to pierce the
corporate veil, however, the appellate court focused on the ab-
sence of adequate proof that CBS completely controlled and di-
' 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972).
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rected Films with respect to the transaction attacked. 50
The appellate court's analysis is consistent with the
Lowendahl rule. '5 Yet the court seems not to come to grips with
the equitable issue of the case. The real transaction attacked was
the contract with Cowley, a transaction entered into by the par-
ent, not by the subsidiary. The only relevance of the subsidiary
was that it had previously entered into an agreement with Berger
which was allegedly breached by the CBS-Cowley contract.
c. Critique of Berger
We suggest that the inflexible application of Lowendahl was
inappropriate in the Berger case. There was no doubt that CBS
had the potential to control Films, although there was a lack of
proof of complete domination with respect to the Berger contract.
It appears inequitable that CBS should have such control of its
subsidiary that it had all the practical advantages of a direct
contract with Berger yet none of the responsibilities. Neither
Films nor CBS alone could have contracted first with Berger and
then with Cowley with impunity. Where there was a cooperative
transaction with Berger involving both CBS and Films, where
CBS had the ability to dominate Films and to take advantage of
the Berger idea, and where CBS had a beneficial interest both in
Films generally and in the Berger transaction particularly, we
think the. veil should have been pierced.
It therefore appears that the better reasoned cases in the
mutually improper act cases go beyond a mere rote application
of the Powell rule, a rule that was designed to apply to a parent
which used its subsidiary to carry out an unjust act. In the mu-
tually improper act sphere, the dominant party and the subsidi-
ary corporation jointly perform some unfair action. It hardly mat-
ters which party performs the act. What does matter is that both
parties have a common interest and knowledge, that one is gener-
ally responsible, because of its dominance, for the acts of both,
and that they deal inequitably with a third party. In such cases,
piercing the veil appears appropriate.
We would submit that the foregoing five categories cover the
various instances in which the corporate veil will be pierced. One
110 Id. at 996.
"I See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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starts with the assumption that all of the three preconditions will
be present in any valid case and then proceeds to determine
whether one or more of the five categories-violation of public
policy, misrepresentation, lack of economic substance, participa-
tion, or mutually improper acts-is also present. If so, there is a
basis for piercing the corporate veil. The determination of how to
treat these factors, what importance to give them, and how they
relate to each other must be made in the context of the degree of
impropriety involved and must further be based on certain over-
riding policy considerations as hereafter discussed.
D. Policy Considerations
If all of the necessary preconditions are found to be present
and if one or more improper purposes exist to a sufficient degree,
then the corporate veil will ordinarily be pierced. The question of
whether there is a sufficient degree of improper purpose is, how-
ever, difficult, and the courts are often left to struggle with this
issue for which no rule offers much useful guidance. In such situa-
tions, general policy considerations are often helpful.
As indicated before, there are applicable general policy con-
siderations, including the importance of preserving corporate lim-
ited liability'52 and the customary considerations that govern any
equitable case. No additional discussion of these factors seems
useful here. There are, however, two particular policy considera-
tions that deserve some separate discussion: legitimacy of corpo-
rate purpose and the risk of loss.
1. Legitimacy of Corporate Purpose
In determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil,
courts seem to consider whether there is a legitimate purpose for
the existence of the corporation. '53 Although courts frequently
state that the same general rule applies to all situations,' it
would appear that a parent-subsidiary relationship will be more
closely scrutinized and may be more readily subject to having the
veil pierced than would a close corporation with individual share-
holders.
,52 See generally note 4 supra.
' Such legitimate purposes would include the full range of purposes which are recog-
nized as a matter of economic policy as justifying corporate limited liability,
,' See note 23 supra.
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For example, in Zubik v. Zubik,1 5 the court found that an
individual shareholder had set up a closely held corporation, had
undercapitalized the corporation, and had dealt with it in a
highly informal way, including a failure to memorialize his lease
arrangements in writing or to maintain written minutes of meet-
ings. The court also found that the shareholder had casually in-
termingled his personal and corporate assets, including payment
of personal expenses out of corporate accounts. However, in hold-
ing that the individual shareholder was not liable for damage
done by his corporation's barges, the court pointed out that the
shareholder was old, in ill health, and illiterate and that he had
legitimate reasons for incorporating the business to provide lim-
ited liability protection for himself in a business over which he
had little active control. It seems doubtful that a similar conclu-
sion would have been reached in a situation where a corporation
set up a subsidiary to insulate itself from similar liability.
It would appear that there are at least two considerations at
work here. First, the degree of sophistication of the shareholders
is to be taken into account, and, consequently, an illiterate old
man should not be held to the same standard of conduct that
would apply to a sophisticated corporate defendant. Secondly, it
may be recognized that there is less justification for providing
multiple-limited-liability insulation to a corporation which
wishes to segregate high risk activities than there would be for an
individual shareholder or a group of individuals who wished to
take advantage of the corporate limited-liability feature. The fact
the law permits corporate limited liability may not be a license
for creating an infinite series of corporations, each with the same
degree of limited liability that would be granted to individuals
who form an initial corporation. While it may be necessary as a
matter of good public policy to provide limited liability to encour-
age the infusion of capital into new corporations, it is less clear
that limited liability through subsidiaries is necessary to encour-
age existing corporations to enter into new and perhaps riskier
businesses.
An example of the courts' consideration of the legitimacy of
the subsidiary corporation's purpose is found in the distributor-
ship cases. 5' In these cases there appears to be no reason for
.' 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
1"4 See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
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multiple corporations except to try to provide insulation from
products liability suits. Note that these cases do not generally
involve a lack of economic substance. Both the distributing com-
pany and the manufacturing company ordinarily have adequate
assets and insurance to bear whatever financial risk is involved.
Instead, the goal appears to be to create procedural roadblocks
to force a plaintiff to sue the manufacturer who may be subject
to process only in a foreign jurisdiction.
Thus, the courts apparently feel that the right to corporate
limited liability is by no means an absolute right and that cynical
misuse for something more than merely limiting liability in a
traditional sense will be scrutinized closely.
2. Bearing the Risk
Riskbearing is an economic concept generally applicable to
tort cases. The distinction between tort and contract cases in the
corporate veil area is one that is frequently made.'57 In a contract
case there is likely to be a much higher degree of reliance by the
plaintiff, for example, with respect to misrepresentations as to
the relationship of the dominant party and subservient corpora-
tion, than is true in the tort area. There is also a greater degree
of volition in the contract case, when the plaintiff voluntarily,
albeit often unwisely, 5 8 elects to do business with the subservient
corporation. In a tort case, on the other hand, there is both a
moral and an economic concern that the risk of injury or loss not
be apportioned in an unreasonable way. 5' This is an area in which
the courts have had great difficulty, as illustrated by the two
following cases.
In Black & White, Inc. v. Love,"'6 the plaintiff had called the
Black & White Cab Company and ordered two taxis. Two cabs
were sent, one a Black & White cab and the other a Checkers cab.
The plaintiff's wife was injured in an accident while riding in the
Checker cab. The evidence showed that Black & White shared a
radio dispatcher, used the same switch board operator, and that
both operator and dispatcher were on the payroll of Black &
White. While there is some confusion in the opinion as to whether
"7 See note 22 supra.
"5 See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
"' See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF Tom, § 4 (4th ed. 1971).
'o 236 Ark. 529, 367 S.W.2d 427 (1963).
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or not the decision was based on a joint venture theory or on a
piercing-the-corporate-veil theory, the result was that the plain-
tiff was allowed to recover against Black & White.
By contrast, consider Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical
Corp. 6 There, Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corporation (RTAC)
had a substantial business with several airplanes engaged in the
air carrier business. The sole shareholder of RTAC also owned
Turner Aviation Corporation (TAC) which had a single airplane
as its principal asset. When the plaintiff requested transportation
to Chicago, an airplane from RTAC and another airplane from
TAC were made available. The plane from TAC crashed, killing
the passengers, and the decedent's estate brought an action
against RTAC on a piercing-the-veil theory. The court held that
the corporate veil of RTAC could not be pierced despite the fact
that the corporations had the same shareholder and substantial
identity of officers and directors and that the second airplane was
provided to customers who had contracted originally with RTAC.
There seems little doubt that there is a discernible tendency
for businessmen who are engaged in high risk activities to divide
their operations into separate corporations." 2 This tendency
seems objectionable on several bases. First, there is a moral objec-
tion to a policy that prohibits one injured in an accident involving
a substantial economic organization from having recourse against
the total organization. This seems to be a perversion of the tradi-
tional notion that investors can limit their personal exposure by
creating a corporation. Secondly, any sound economic analysis
would suggest that the most effective way of distributing the risk
should be to assign liability to the total organization and that the
law should encourage such organization to insure fully and ade-
quately. Finally, it seems absurd to have a legal policy which
encourages the proliferation of corporations, with all of the conse-
quential legal and administrative expense, for the sole purpose of
protecting against tort liability. It therefore appears that the
Black & White case presents the better view-the total organiza-
tion should not be allowed to be artifically subdivided for the sole
purpose of limiting liability. This is not to endorse any general
policy of piercing the veil simply to place the risk of loss on an
SI 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963).
62 See Comment, supra note 4, at 1191.
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economically identifiable party. But where there are other factors
indicating the propriety of piercing the veil, consideration may
properly be given to risk of loss factors.
8 3
E. Relationship of Ultimate Issues
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that all of the ultimate
issues discussed above are closely interrelated. For convenience
there is some value in discussing them individually and attempt-
ing to analyze separately the considerations applicable to each.
In a particular case one consideration may control while in an-
other the overall analysis and the relative weight and importance
of each of the other ultimate issues will have to be decided within
the context of the specific facts. For example, grossly inadequate
undercapitalization may be a sufficient basis by itself, or in con-
junction with other minor factors, to cause the corporate veil to
be pierced. Similarly, a very substantial breach of some impor-
tant public policy through the subservient corporation may simi-
larly cause the veil to be pierced almost without regard to other
factors. On the other hand, lack of economic substance combined
with some misrepresentation and indications that the dominant
party is using the corporate structure for an illegitimate purpose,
may cause the veil to be pierced where no single factor by itself
appears to be overpowering. The courts can provide us with no
formula for the application of these factors, but the ultimate
issues may at least provide a starting point for focusing the in-
quiry.
III. WEAVING AN IMPENETRABLE VEIL
A. Practical Applications v. Theory
It is no doubt appropriate that an article written by a law
professor and a practicing corporate attorney should take a some-
what bifurcated approach to analyzing the problems of piercing
the corporate veil. On the one side, we must be concerned with
63 For example, one factor common to both the Black & White and Turner cases is
that the plaintiff contracted with the corporate defendant and may have believed that the
taxi and plane respectively were controlled by the corporate defendant being sued. Argua-
bly, this misrepresentation could shift the risk of loss to the defendant. For other discus-
sion of the risk of loss consideration, see Douglas & Shanks supra note 4, at 195; Hamilton,
supra note 22, at 986-87; Comment supra note 4, at 1195-96. See also Gentry v. Credit
Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), where the court said that the
problem was essentially one of allocating the loss.
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the underlying rationale of the courts, the true importance and
relationship of the ultimate issues which they should or do con-
sider, and the policies that may influence the decisions. On the
other side, we must recognize that the concern with the ultimate
issues which we perceive in the opinions has little obvious relev-
ance to many decisions. In practice, there is a somewhat confused
approach and what often seems to be a superficial application of
the Powell circumstances or some similar checklist. The courts
often state a vague general rule, list various factors, and an-
nounce a decision, often without articulating how the decision
relates to either the rule or to the factors. From the corporate
client's point of view, the reality of what he can or cannot do must
be of considerably more importance than the theoretical sound-
ness of the approaches which the courts are taking. However, it
is helpful and often crucial for the practitioner to understand the
issues that are of real concern to the better reasoned cases, as well
as the rules and factors courts recite to justify conclusions
reached by their application of the ultimate issues. Thus far, this
article has identified and analyzed the ultimate issues; the re-
mainder of the article will suggest a list of factors noted by courts
in recent decisions.
Some of the practicalities of how to structure a corporation
and its business operations in such a way as to minimize the
likelihood of the veil being pierced are demonstrated by the fol-
lowing cases.
B. A Successful Attempt
The case of American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fisch-
bach & Moore, Inc.'64 illustrates how to establish and operate a
subsidiary so as to avoid having a court pierce the veil. Moreover,
the case shows how to defeat a claim at the summary judgment
stage. The parent corporation, Fischbach & Moore Electrical
Contracting, Inc., installed electrical wiring in a large Chicago
exhibition hall, giving rise to the subject litigation. The building
was subsequently destroyed by fire, allegedly because of improper
wiring. In an action for losses arising out of the fire, the court
determined that the subsidiary was not a mere instrumentality
of the plaintiff under a variation of the Powell rule."5 The follow-
'0 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
"' Id. at 415.
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ing facts were considered by the court in reaching its decision to
grant a summary judgment in favor of the parent. At the time of
the tort, all four of the subsidiary's directors were also directors
of the parent and four of its eight officers were officers of the
parent. However, the corporations maintained separate offices
and conducted separate directors' meetings, the subsidiary main-
tained its own financial books and records, and the subsidiary
had a separate bank account and negotiated its own loans from
third parties, even though the loans were reviewed and guaran-
teed by the parent. The subsidiary had borrowed money from the
parent, but only under very formal circumstances, that is, the
loans were evidenced by notes and called for interest at the prime
rate. The subsidiary and parent filed separate tax returns even
though their financial statements were consolidated. Their pay-
rolls were separate although the salary levels which were deter-
mined by the subsidiary were subject to review by the parent. The
two corporations had never purchased goods or services from each
other. Labor relations were independently handled by each corpo-
ration.'
Although the subsidiary notified the parent of bids made on
contracting jobs and of contracts awarded, neither bids nor con-
tracts were reviewed by the parent. The manner of performance
and the materials to be used on the projects were not subject to
review by the parent but the profit mark-up contracts exceeding
$5 million was to be determined only after consulting with the
parent. The subsidiary also forwarded schedules to the parent
regarding new jobs acquired and contracts on hand for each three-
month period and submitted reports on material purchases, esti-
mates, salary changes, and financial data on a more frequent
basis, but there was no evidence that the parent acted as a result
of any of these reports." 7 Other evidence tending to show more-
than-typical-shareholder interest or control by the parent in-
cluded the following: On one occasion, the subsidiary sought re-
view by the parent of a lease it had negotiated for additional yard
space for its equipment; the parent had determined on other
occasions which of its subsidiaries should bid on a particular
project; and the parent's management considered the subsidiary
l Id. at 414, 416.
187 Id. at 414.
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to be part on its family, as evidenced by its annual reports and
advertising in Fortune magazine, where the parent had claimed
credit in its own name for projects, including the Chicago exhibi-
tion hall project at issue in the instant case.' 8 There was, how-
ever, no showing that any of the plaintiffs had been misled as to
the identity or financial resources of the subsidiary.
The court also examined financial data relevant to the sub-
sidiary. The subsidiary's net worth was $511,503 in 1966 and
$684,574 in 1967. The subsidiary had paid dividends of $100,000
in 1966 and $369,000 in 1967, which had amounted to substan-
tially all of its after-tax earnings. These figures represented ap-
proximately 4.42% and 8.07%, respectively, of the consolidated
gross income of the parent and all its subsidiaries. The parent's
gross income, apart from the income from subsidiaries, approxi-
mated $77 million in each of the two years. The court concluded
that the subsidiary had a very adequate capitalization and that
the parent had not isolated a great deal of its income through the
creation of subsidiaries. More importantly, the claims at issue
were covered by $15 million of insurance, which exceeded aggre-
gate claims.' 9
The court observed that the facts showed, at most, that the
parent exercised supervision and guidance of the general perform-
ance of the subsidiary. The court noted that "such participation
in a subsidiary's affairs does not amount to the domination of
day-to-day business decisions and disregard of the corporate en-
tity necessary to impose liability on a parent." 0 Finally, it was
apparent that formalities in this case had been followed to the
"nth degree" and the court concluded that "separate corporate
identities had been scrupuously maintained." 7 '
C. An Unsuccessful Attempt
A case which illustrates the circumstances in which the cor-
porate veil is likely to be pierced is Ampex Corp. v. Office Elec-
tronics, Inc."' There, the plaintiff-creditor was allowed by the
court to pierce the veil of a subsidiary to find Office Electronics,
1i' Id.
I' d. at 414-15.
,0 Id. at 415.
171 Id.
17 24 I1. App. 3d 21, 320 N.E.2d 486 (1974).
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Inc., the parent corporation, liable. The court, using an instru-
mentality-alter ego theory, 7 3 first determined the extent to
which the parent had intervened in the operation of the subsidi-
ary. The following factors were enumerated by the court: (1) Two
of the three directors of the subsidiary were officers of the parent;
(2) the parent owned fifty-one percent of the subsidiary; (3) when
the plaintiff had refused to grant corporate credit to the subsidi-
ary, the parent agreed to inventory $20,000 worth of tapes for the
benefit of the subsidiary; (4) the parent advanced monies to the
subsidiary for its commission sales accounts; (5) the parent re-
ceived merchandise for the subsidiary from the plaintiff, along
with monthly statements and invoices; and (6) the parent did all
the shipping and billing to the customers of the subsidiary. In
addition, the parent had continued to pay for verbal orders made
by the subsidiary, even after the parent had given written instruc-
tions to the plaintiff not to conduct business on this basis. These
factors established not only direct intervention by the parent, but
they also showed that the plaintiff-creditor was misled by the
parent since the creditor really dealt with the parent as the person
in charge as opposed to the subsidiary. That is, the plaintiff sent
the statements and inventories to the parent, met with the parent
and the subsidiary when discussing the subsidiary's credit ar-
rangements, and received payment from the parent for the mer-
chandise sold to the subsidiary. Finally, the subsidiary may have
been inadequately capitalized. It had, initially, capital of $16,000
with no other assets, although, from the outset, it planned to
inventory $20,000 worth of magnetic tapes as well as incur other
expenses.
A comparison of Fischbach and Ampex demonstrates the
desirability not only of being right, but of being right by a wide
margin. It does the defendant relatively little good to prevail
ultimately on the facts after an expensive and time-consuming
trial. Instead, the object should be to prevail on a motion on the
pleadings or by a summary judgment motion, which is in fact the
stage at which an unusually large number of corporate veil cases
seem to be decided. 74
" See note 48 supra.
"' See, e.g., Overstreet v. Southern Ry., 371 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1967); Steven v.
Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); Fanfan v. Berwind Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 793 (D. Penn. 1973); American Trading & Professional Corp. v. Fischbach
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D. The Practitioner's Checklist
Recent court decisions have identified a number of factors
which should be taken into consideration when attempting to
keep the corporate veil intact. One should attempt to comply
with as many of these factors as possible. To the extent that not
all of the factors can be complied with, it should at least be one's
object to stay on the right side of those which are clearly substan-
tive matters going to ultimate issues, as opposed to those which
are likely to be found in any parent-subsidiary relationship. The
factors tending to support separate corporate entities in recent
cases include the following: '
1. The shareholder is not a party to the contractual or other obliga-
tion of the corporation.17'
2. The subsidiary is not undercapitalized.'
3. The subsidiary does not operate at a deficit while the parent is
showing a profit.178
4. The creditors of the companies are not misled as to which com-
pany they are dealing with. 7 '
5. Creditors are iot misled as to the financial strength of the sub-
sidiary."'
6. The employees of the parent and subsidiary are separate and the
parent does not hire and fire employees of the subsidiary."'
& Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (D. Ill. 1970); Brown v. Margrande Compania Naviera,
S.A. 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968); Fawcett v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 242 F. Supp. 675
(W.D. La. 1965). But see FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191: "[Ailthough summary
judgment may be granted in a proper case where no genuine issue of fact is raised or
shown, the determination of whether there are sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate
veil should not ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment in view of the complex
economic questions."
"I There is no firm relationship between the ultimate issues and the factors. The
factors, to a large extent, are relevant in demonstrating that the corporation in question
is an instrumentality and to a much lesser extent can also show an improper purpose.
,'7 See, e.g., American Trading & Professional Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 311
F. Supp. 412, 413 (D. II. 1970).
'" See text accompanying notes 120-41 supra.
,7, See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (all profits and tax losses of
subsidary flow through to parent); Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
1975) (subsidiary had operated at deficit for number of years).
,' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 416, with My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968) and Zaist v. Olson, 154
Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (1967) (confusion led to misunderstanding).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 416, with Puamier v. Barge BT 1793,
395 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (E.D. Va. 1974).
"' Compare American Trading, discussed in text accompanying notes 155-62 supra,
with Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355
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7. The payroll of the subsidiary is paid by the subsidiary and the
salary levels are set by the subsidiary.'
8. The labor relations of the two companies are handled separately
and independently.'
8 3
9. The parent and subsidiary maintain separate offices and tele-
phone numbers.'8
10. Separate directors' meetings are condpcted.'"
11. The subsidiary maintains financial books and records which
contain entries related only to its own operations.' 8
12. The subsidiary has its own bank account.'87
13. The earnings of the subsidiary are not reflected on the financial
reports of the parent in determining the parent's income. 88
14. The companies do not file joint tax returns.'
15. The subsidiary negotiates its own loans or other financing 9 0
16. The subsidiary does not borrow money from the parent.''
17. Loans and other financial transactions between the parent and
subsidiary are properly documented and conducted on an arm's-
length basis.'
(1974) (same employees) and House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics,
Inc., 468 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1972) (Turner fired American line and Koscot employees)
and Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. 528 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex. 1975) (controlling corpora-
tion interviewed, evaluated, and selected managers).
82 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (paid by subsidiary but subject
to review by parent) with Elvalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 525 P.2d 105,
108 (1974) (paid by parent and court does pierce veil) and House of Koscot, 468 F.2d at
66 (paid by parent and court does pierce veil) and Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968) (employees paid by parent but court does not pierce
veil).
' See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414.
Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Elvalsons v. Industrial
Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 446, 525 P.2d 105, 108 (1974) and My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 616-17, 233 N.E.2d 748, 750 (1968).
"5 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc.,
26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667, 669 (1971), and United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F.
Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974) (subsidiary board had not met since 1971 and when it did it
merely rubber stamped the decisions of parent boards).
I" Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Gentry v. Credit Plan
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975) (management firm hired by parent keeps records).
"7 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Soderberg Advertising, Inc.
v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355, 1359-60 (1974) (subsidiary held
own bank account but balance kept at zero).
8 But see Jackson v. General Elec., 514 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alas. 1973).
81 Compare Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), with
United States v. Wood, 366 F. Supp. 1074, 1081-82 n.11 (Cust. Ct. 1973) rev'd, 505 F.2d
1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (court said ministerial cooperation was permissible).
See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414.
' See, e.g., Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524
P.2d 1355, 1362 (1974).
"2 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (loans evidenced by formalities)
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18. The parent does not guarantee the loans of the subsidiary or
secure any loan with assets of the parent.
3
19. The subsidiary's income represents a small percentage of the
total income of the parent. "
20. The insurance of the two companies is maintained separately
and each pays its own premiums."
21. The purchasing activities of the two corporations are handled
separately."
22. The two companies avoid advertising as a joint activity or other
public relations which indicate that they are the same organiza-
tion.' 7
23. The parent and subsidiary avoid referring to each other as one
family, organization, or as divisions of one another."'
24. The equipment and other goods of the parent and subsidiary
are separate."'
25. The two companies do not exchange assets or liabilities.2"
26. There are no contracts between the parent and subsidiary with
respect to purchasing goods and services from each other.2"
with Soderberg Advertising Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355,
1357 (1974) (unclear if formalities observed).
"I Compare United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974)
(debts of subsidiary guaranteed by parent) with Schlecht v. Equitable Builders, Inc., 272
Or. 92, 95, 535 P.2d 86, 89 (1975) (loans to parent guaranteed by subsidiary and other loans
secured by assets of subsidiary but court did not pierce veil because no harm to plaintiff)
and Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (parent
guaranteed only certain of subsidiary's debts and these were discharged by subsidiary).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414 (small percentage of income) with
Shirley v. Drackett Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970)
(parent's only source of revenue was sales of subsidiary).
" Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc.
v. Oppenstein, 355 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1964).
"' Compare Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 521 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975) (president of subsidiary did not require parent's authorization in making purchases
and sales within ordinary course of business) with Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-
Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 524 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1974) (parent paid bills).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, and Soderberg Advertising, Inc.
v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 725, 524 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (1974) (both cases
involved some joint advertising; veil pierced in Soderberg but not in American Trading)
with Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1964) (parent
controlled advertising).
"' Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with GAF Corp. v. Hanimex
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (corporation referred to as Chicago office of
another) and Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir.
1963) (TAC not described as a division).
"' See, e.g., American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415.
Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415, with Soderberg.Advertising, Inc.
v. Kent-Moore Corp., 11 Wash. App. 721, 729, 524 P.2d 1355, 1362 (1974).
"I Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with Shirley v. Drackett Prods.,
26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970) (exclusive distributorship).
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27. The subsidiary and the parent do not deal exclusively with
each other."'
28. The parent does not review the subsidiary's contracts, bids, or
other financial activities in greater detail than would be normal for
a shareholder who is merely interested in the profitability of the
business.2 3
29. The parent does not supervise the manner in which the subsidi-
ary's jobs are carried out."
30. The parent does not have a substantial veto power over impor-
tant business decisions of the subsidiary 5 and does not itself make
such crucial decisions.
31. The parent and subsidiary are engaged in different lines of
business.2"
E. Using the Checklist
The above factors are not necessarily presented as a logical
or preferable measure for determining when to pierce the corpo-
rate veil.m7 They are, however, factors which have been listed by
one or more courts as relevant considerations to be taken into
account in making such a determination. Therefore, anyone at-
tempting to set up a subsidiary which will be fully viable should
try to comply with as many of them as possible. In many cases it
will be noted that compliance is, after all, a fairly easy matter and
2 Compare Bay Sound Trans. Co. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1973) (no other business) and Shirley v. Drackett
Prods. Co., 26 Mich. App. 644, 648-49, 182 N.W.2d 726, 728 (1970) (exclusive distributor-
ship) and United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974) (no
other customers) with Jackson v. General Elec., 514 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alas. 1973).
20 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 415, with My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 620-21, 233 N.E.2d 748, 753 (1968) (parent
negotiates for subsidiary).
20 Compare American Trading, 311 F. Supp. at 414, with My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 620-21, 233 N.E.2d 748, 752 (1968) (corporate
defendant ordered not to return racks giving rise to cause of action) and Elvalsons v.
Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441, 445-46, 525 P.2d 105, 108 (1974) (manager of subsidi-
ary required to report to parent's general manager).
25 See, e.g., House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, 468 F.2d 64,
66 (5th Cir. 1972); Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 876 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28 (D. Minn. 1974).
2 Compare Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975), with
Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1963), and Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 113 (7th Cir. 1974).
For other lists of factors, see BALLAN'rNE, supra note 1, § 136 at 314; FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 41.3 at 191; HENN, supra note 1, §§ 147, 148 at 256-59; Douglas & Shanks,
supra note-4, at 195-96; Note, supra note 8, at 1126; Hamilton, supra note 22, at 998. For
a list of factors by Colorado courts, see Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
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the slight additional effort and expense should be incurred to
insure corporate indestructibility.
We do not mean to suggest that mere mechanical compliance
with the foregoing factors will insure an impenetrable veil.2'" The
ultimate issues discussed in the foregoing sections are of direct
and major importance. In structuring any corporate relationship,
careful thought should be given to such ultimate issues and to the
effect that they have on each other. For example, the most strin-
gent efforts to satisfy some mechanical check list will not protect
a corporation where it is being used to violate an important public
policy.
In establishing any corporation which is intended to with-
stand efforts to pierce the veil, overkill is justified. That is, not
only should one attempt to meet the minimum standards for
preserving the corporate entity, but one should greatly exceed
those minimum standards if at all possible. The reasons for this
are at least two-fold.
1. Summary Disposition
First, an unusually large number of cases in this area are
resolved at an early stage in the pleadings by a motion to dismiss
or by a summary judgment.2 19 Obviously, it is of great value to
the client to prevail in a law suit at such a stage, without incur-
ring the substantial legal expenses involved in preparing a case
for trial with the attendant interruption of business activities.
Moreover, the defendant in a corporate veil case usually has
available most of the evidence that would support piercing the
veil and, if success can be achieved at some early stage of the
proceedings, there is little opportunity for the plaintiff to develop
such discovery.
2. Preparing for the Unforeseen
Second, no matter how carefully structured the transaction
may be, it is always possible that some developments will occur
which will make a decision in favor of the plaintiff seem equita-
ble. For example, it is entirely possible in the Reserve Mining
"I For a more general checklist of procedures to be followed to weave an impenetrable
veil, see STEVENS, supra note 7, at 87-88; Douglas & Shanks, supra note 4, at 196-98, and
Hamilton, supra note 23, at 993-94.
"I See note 164 supra.
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case 10 that the organizers of the corporation never anticipated
that enormous potential damages for violations of environmental
laws might accrue. Once such damages were alleged, it became
more likely that the subsidiary corporation would be found to be
lacking in economic substance and violative of a strong public
policy. Thus, no matter how strong the case for an impenetrable
veil may seem at the time a corporation is established, there is
always the possiblity that future developments may greatly
weaken its position."'
The conclusion, therefore, should be that one attempting to
weave an impenetrable veil should comply with as many of the
mechanical factors listed by the courts as possible. Such a party
should also keep in mind the importance of complying with basic
policy considerations and, specifically, of staying on the right side
of the various ultimate issues discussed previously.
This section would not be complete without a brief discus-
sion of the problems of the plaintiff in a corporate veil case.
Several suggestions may be useful to such a plaintiff. First, like
the potential defendant, the plaintiff should bear in mind both
the factors, the mechanical tests, which are listed above, and the
ultimate issues which should control the decisions of most courts
and the relationship, if any, of the factors to the issues. Second,
the plaintiff should be aware that in applying traditional varia-
tions of the Powell rule, courts tend to focus heavily on proof of
actual instrumentality with respect to the particular improper
act at issue. Accordingly, evidence must be mustered, not simply
to show general domination of, or potential to control, the subser-
vient corporation, but actual control and direction with respect
to the particular transaction. Far too many plaintiffs fail to pro-
vide the necessary minimum of evidence of instrumentality be-
cause they focus on questions of general rather than specific con-
trol. Third, the plaintiff must be aware that most of the evidence
he needs is in the hands of the defendant."' Moreover, much of
210 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). See text accompanying note 130 supra.
"I See, e.g., Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963),
where causal handling of two separate corporations proved disastrous after one of them
carried passengers for the other and was involved in a fatal accident.
2' See, e.g., Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (the
veil was not pierced to find parent liable for subsidiary's pricing policies which were
allegedly in violation of Robinson-Patman Act. The case was decided on a summary
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his evidence is intangible, for example, the motivations of a key
executive at the time he took some crucial action. It is important
to conduct an immediate and aggressive discovery campaign, to
examine such documentary evidence as may be available and, in
particular, to take extensive depositions before the defendants
have an opportunity to rationalize their own behavior in terms
that will avoid penetration of the veil.
From a practical point of view, it is quite difficult to struc-
ture a case either for or against piercing the veil with complete
certainty. The rules are equitable and their relative importance
varies from one case to another. However, the foregoing guidelines
and careful consideration of the effect of the ultimate issues may
be helpful in focusing legal efforts.
CONCLUSION
The case law and the commentators are by no means totally
successful in attempting to formalize and simplify the rules ap-
plicable to piercing the corporate veil. This, we would submit, is
not the fault of the judges or the commentators but is an inher-
ent problem in this area of the law. We believe that "piercing the
corporate veil" is only a general term under which are subsumed
a multitude of fact situations. No useful general statement can
be made about such situations except that, despite the strong
public policy in favor of preserving corporations, there are situa-
tions in which equity will require that the corporate form be
disregarded. We have categorized some types of cases and fact
situations in connection with our discussion of the ultimate is-
sues. We have no doubt that other situations have arisen or will
arise in which equity will demand that the corporate form be
disregarded. No doubt it is useful to attempt the classifications
and rules, but, as Judge Cardozo pointed out, we must not be-
come lost in the mists of metaphor."'
We are reminded of the analogy drawn by the great analytic
philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein pointed out that
judgment because the only facts presented were that the subsidiary was wholly owned and
an affidavit of the plaintiff which claimed generally that the parent controlled the subsidi-
ary's pricing policies, which was unequivocally denied by the parent and the subsidiary).
See also Fanfan v. Berwind Corp., 362 F. Supp. 793 (D. Pa. 1973).
2I Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 217 N.Y.S. 156 (1926). See
text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
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there are at least some words for which there is no single defini-
tion or common denominator which will be found in'all defini-
tions. Instead, he proposed an analogy comparing such words to
a piece of thread composed of many fibers, with no fiber running
the entire length of the thread, but all of which are intertwined
and together form a single strand."' We would suggest that the
corporate veil is woven from Wittgensteinian threads. We can
identify what we have called "ultimate issues," but we cannot say
that any one will control every case. We hope, however, that an
identification of such ultimate issues may be helpful in focusing
the inquiry and leading to an equitable result.
The resolution of any corporate veil case involves the colli-
sion of an irresistible force-the power of equity-with an im-
movable object-corporate limited liability. Each case must be
decided on the basis of its unique factors. Efforts at simplistic
rules-e.g., piercing the veil whenever there is inadequate capi-
talization-may have disastrous effects not only on the theoreti-
cal structure of corporate law but on the much more important
underlying economic policies. We therefore suggest that the law
must continue to struggle with concepts and rules that may lack
logical purity but which enable the courts to continue their deli-
cate balancing act.
214 L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (1953):
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way.
Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has
a-direct-relationship with several things that have hitherto been called
number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other
things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does
not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but
in the overlapping of many fibres.

